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Abstract 
 
This thesis analyses the considerations of British officials when arriving at positions on 
granting sovereignty/ authority to: (i) the Greeks in Smyrna, southwest Anatolia; (ii) the 
Armenians within north-eastern Anatolia; (iii) the Kurds within south-eastern Anatolia; (iv) 
and the Kurds within the Mosul vilayet (Southern Kurdistan/ present-day northern Iraq), from 
1918-1926. The concepts of “Orientalism” and “civilisation” provide the theoretical basis and 
are applied to the sources analysed. The thesis argues that Britain’s actions were influenced 
by the prevailing stereotypes of each people and “civilisation”, but ultimately rooted in 
political and economic interest. The Paris Peace Conference presented an opportunity to 
strengthen Britain’s position in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East through 
support for the design of friendly states and re-drawing the political map of the territory 
within the former Ottoman empire. Each case was part of the process of erecting a new 
imperial structure in the Middle East. This new structure was to be based upon the organising 
principle of ethnic nationalism, as promoted by the Allied powers, including Britain. The 
British role in each case can be described as: the leading supporter of Greek goals in Anatolia; 
predominantly a supportive observer of Armenian goals in Anatolia, leaving the French to play 
the role of lead supporter; a cautiously supportive observer of the Anatolian Kurds with little 
authority outside of its dictation of the Treaty of Sèvres; and a cautious detractor of the 
autonomy of southern Kurds, having occupied the Mosul vilayet in 1918 and held full colonial 
authority over it, experimenting with autonomy but ultimately deciding on its abandonment. 
By 1926, the goals of the Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
had not been achieved, and all had withered away in British Middle Eastern policy.  
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1 Introduction and research question 
 
During the supremacy of a European imperial system and towards the conclusion of the First 
World War, the idea of “self-determination” for colonised peoples became a topic of Allied 
discourse. In good faith or otherwise, US President Woodrow Wilson’s “Fourteen Points for 
World Peace” speech on 8th January 1918 had shown crucial reception to this idea, with his 
twelfth point stating: 
‘the Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, 
but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted 
security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development’.1 
The Great War on the Eastern Front was concluded by the signing of the armistice of Mudros 
in 30th October 1918. This solely involved the parties of Great Britain and the Ottoman empire. 
At the Paris Peace Conference, the “Big Four” Entente powers (Great Britain, France, the 
United States and Italy), victorious in their war efforts against the Central Powers (Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman empire, and Bulgaria), were now confronted with the question 
of the right to sovereignty and independence of numerous delegations of peoples under 
colonial administration. 
However, political and economic considerations, as well as archetypal perceptions of 
peoples and “civilisations” permeated the British and Allied approaches. Thus, there 
appeared radically different British perceptions of granting authority, sovereignty and 
independence to different ethnic groups within the Ottoman empire. This thesis seeks to 
analyse the considerations of British officials when arriving at positions on granting 
sovereignty/ authority to: (i) the Greeks in Smyrna, southwest Anatolia; (ii) Armenians within 
north-eastern Anatolia; (iii) Kurds within south-eastern Anatolia; (iv) and Kurds within the 
Mosul vilayet (Southern Kurdistan/ present-day northern Iraq), considering a diverse range of 
factors. It will examine the British position in respect of Greece, including the military 
expansion into İzmir (referred to henceforth as Smyrna, its name prior to 1930), its position 
                                                             
1 [Woodrow Wilson] David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, I.B. Tauris (London, 2010), p. 115. 
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on the proposed creation of an autonomous and independent Armenian Republic in north-
eastern Anatolia and an autonomous Kurdistan within south-eastern Anatolia.2 Moreover, it 
will discuss the transformation of the British empire’s policy in respect of the governance of 
the vilayet (an Ottoman district/ province) of Mosul (encompassing the Sanjaks of Mosul, 
Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah), between 1918-26. It must be stated, however, that none of the 
areas studied in this thesis are ethnically homogenous, although Justin McCarthy’s study of 
the 1912-13 Ottoman censuses demonstrate Muslims constituted the ‘overwhelming’ 
majority in every vilayet (province) of Anatolia.3 
This thesis intends to answer the research question: Which factors best explain the 
British discourse and decisions on the autonomy and authority of the Greeks, Armenians and 
Kurds in Anatolia and “Southern Kurdistan”, 1918-1926? This constitutes a unique study which 
builds upon existing literature. The choice of these three cases is related to the making and 
aftermath of the content of the two peace treaties with the Ottoman empire. Firstly, the 
Treaty of Sèvres (the final treaty to emerge from the Paris Peace Conference), signed 10th 
August 1920 but never ratified, and secondly the Treaty of Lausanne, in session from 20th 
November 1922, with negotiations interrupted between 4th February and 23rd April 1923, and 
finally signed 21st July 1923.4 In order to provide a satisfactory answer to this research 
question, this work will analyse both the significance of political and economic factors as well 
as conceptions of a hierarchy of peoples and “civilisations” and the limitations of these factors  
upon British policymakers. The significance of the term discourse is to identify the variety of 
views within British Governmental departments and offices, in addition to the malleability of 
these positions in the context of a changing political landscape in Anatolia. It also assumes 
there was a lack of unity between Allied policies on the negotiations of the Sèvres and 
Lausanne Treaties, as is asserted by Alan Everard Montgomery.5  
                                                             
2 See Articles 62-64 of the Treaty of Sèvres: in Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 vol. II, Carnegie 
Endowment for international peace (New York, 1924) pp. 807-808 (see appendix 6 and figure 1). 
3 Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925, University of Texas Press 
(Austin, 1989), p. 19. 
4 Fiona Venn, ‘Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil, Anglo-American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922-23’, Diplomacy & 
Statecraft, 20:1 (2009), p. 414. 
5 Alan Montgomery, ‘The making of the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920’, The Historical Journal, 15:4 (1972), p. 775. 
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These selected cases represent the most significant historical decisions concerning the 
Ottoman empire’s First World War peace settlement that are still resonant in contemporary 
Middle Eastern politics. Since the 1923 Greco-Turkish population exchange after the Treaty 
of Lausanne, the Greek and Armenian population of Smyrna has been insignificant, and 
Turkey has retained territorial integrity over Anatolia. This study traces the origins of the post-
First World War borders of Iraq, Turkey, and Syria which, in addition to the Kurdish portion of 
Iran, remain central to the question of Kurdish sovereignty. Great Power interests in Middle 
Eastern oil has, since this period, increased exponentially. The Kurdish issue has risen to 
prominence in current affairs, with ongoing conflict between the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK) 
and the Turkish state; Turkey’s recent operation “olive branch” launched in the Syrian city of 
Afrin against various Kurdish forces; the exhaustive attempts to capture Mosul due to its 
significant oil deposits by multiple forces; a referendum for Kurdish independence in the semi-
autonomous Southern Kurdistan in Iraq (2017); and the repeated reference by prominent 
Turkish politicians such as Süleyman Demirel and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to the 
renewal of Sèvres conditions placed upon Turkey by the West, widely characterised as “Sèvres 
syndrome”.6 These current political realities are rooted in the decisions made during the 
period in question in which Britain played a pivotal role. In each selected case, the goals of 
the ethnic group were not achieved, however, the ethnic groups possess unique relationships 
with British officials and each case was handled differently by the British.  
The terms of these treaties shaped the borders of the modern Middle East and provide 
great insight into the involvement of colonial Powers in the region. The evidence considered 
will contribute to a picture of changing British visions for Anatolia, Thrace and Kurdistan, as 
well as perceptions of the various ethnic groups involved. The British role in each case can be 
described as: in the instance of the Greek operation in Anatolia, Britain was the leading 
supporter; in the case of Anatolian Armenia, Britain was predominantly a supportive observer 
leaving the French to play the role of lead supporter; in the case of Anatolian Kurds, Britain 
was a cautiously supportive observer with little authority outside of its dictation of the Treaty 
of Sèvres; finally, in the case of the southern Kurds (in the territory which would become 
                                                             
6 Fatem Göçek, The Transformation of Turkey Redefining State and Society from the Ottoman Empire to the Modern Era, I.B. 
Tauris (London, 2011), p. 98. 
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northern Iraq) Britain was a cautious detractor having occupied the Mosul vilayet in 1918 and 
held full colonial authority over it, experimenting with autonomy but ultimately deciding on 
its abandonment. 
This thesis will expound the following arguments. Britain’s actions were influenced by 
the prevailing stereotypes of each people and “civilisation”, but ultimately rooted in political 
and economic interest. Although, the realities of security and peace restricted British 
capabilities in forcibly attaining these results. Conceptions of “civilisation” adulterated 
western officials’ perceptions of different peoples’ right to and capacity for independence and 
self-governance. However, this factor cannot fully explain the British vision for the Middle 
East nor can it substitute factors such as geopolitical and economic interests. Achieving the 
initial British political vision for the post-First World War Middle East involved a concerted 
effort to weaken the Turkish state and ensure its separation from its former imperial 
possessions (in similar fashion to Austria), with the concurrent strengthening of Greece and 
expansion of its borders into Asia Minor. Secondary and subordinate to this goal was British 
support for the creation of an autonomous Armenia and Kurdistan within Anatolia, for 
Kurdistan, under the condition that its leadership sufficiently lobbied the newly established 
“League of Nations” (LN) for independence.7 This was part of an attempt to carve out a 
political landscape which could be penetrated for the benefit of British interest. These 
experimental attempts at border drawing are reminiscent of those in sub-Saharan Africa in 
the 1880s and arguably constitute an attempt to promote the continuity of European 
imperialism “on the cheap” as the majority of European states had suffered heavy losses of 
life, property, finance and power as a direct result of the Great War. The knowledge of 
Ottoman/ Young Turk atrocities against the Armenians, Assyrians and Pontic Greeks (in the 
Black Sea region of northern Anatolia) during the War, reinforced by longstanding western 
“Orientalist” thought and justified the “punishment of the Turk” and anti-Ottoman/ Muslim 
sentiment.8 
                                                             
7 See Articles 62-64 of the Treaty of Sèvres: in Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923, pp. 807-808 (see 
appendix 6). 
8 Alan Montgomery, ‘The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres’, p. 777. 
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 This thesis will outline a definition of the concept of “Orientalism” and the western 
conception of “civilisation”, review the relevant literature and detail the research 
methodology utilised. It will chronicle the details of the relevant historical context and analyse 
discourse to determine the most important forces and influences upon British policy in order 
to develop a view of the differences and similarities between the British policies towards each 
of the selected ethnic groups. The chapters will explore each case individually, then the 
assessment of each case will be compared in the conclusion.  
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Figure 1 (below) Map of the Treaty of Sèvres (1920) in: Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 
vol. II, Carnegie Endowment for international peace (New York, 1924), p. 789. 
 
Figure 2 (above) Map of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) in: Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-
1923 vol. II, Carnegie Endowment for international peace (New York, 1924), p. 989. 
Leiden University 
International Relations MA 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
7 
1.1  Western conceptions of civilisation in the “Near East” 
 
The subject of research, the post-war task of delivering representation to stateless peoples in 
the Middle East, required the Allies to consider the ethnic, religious, territorial and cultural 
characteristics which shaped the region. This can also be linked to longstanding European 
conceptions of the “Near East”, as well as conceptions of distinctive “civilisations”. Ordering 
the world into states necessitated ‘the compartmentalisation of the planet into discrete 
civilisations… against the backdrop of imperialism, racial doctrine, and the agenda of pan-
nationalist movements’.9 The treatment of ethnicity and biases towards peoples due to 
archetypal perceptions of their inherited characteristics (mainly, in this case, with relation to 
simplified views of the history of the people within the region). This is integral to the concept 
of Orientalism, which Edward Said argues ‘expresses and represents that part culturally and 
even ideologically as a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, 
scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles.’10 The 
components listed, according to Said’s concept, contributed towards a reductive western 
image of negative stereotypes of the Near East, frequently serviced as evidence for western 
innate superiority.11 This thesis will critically examine the interplay of this concept of ordered 
civilisation and Orientalism in British discourse and decision-making on the Greek, Armenian, 
and Kurdish ethnicities calls for self-determination in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan. 
                                                             
9 Sebastian Conrad, What is Global History?, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 2016), p. 31. 
10 Edward Said, Orientalism, Random House, Inc. (New York, 1979), p. 2. 
11 Ibid., p. 7. 
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1.2 Literature review 
 
The most prominent survey of the early negotiations is offered by Paul Helmreich’s “From 
Paris To Sèvres”, published in 1974. The British perspective on Mudros to Lausanne is handled 
by Alan Everard Montgomery’s doctoral thesis “Allied policies from the Armistice of Mudros, 
30th October, 1918, to the Treaty of Lausanne, 24th July, 1923”. Additional articles by 
Montgomery and Theo Karvounarakis address both the Treaties of Sèvres and Lausanne, with 
Montgomery assessing the context for the signature of the Sèvres Treaty and the early 
historiographical literature available despite Montgomery contentiously declaring the Treaty 
‘stillborn’.12 Karvounarakis summarises the British, Turkish and Greek positions on both 
treaties. Various other scholars handle the post-war settlements more concisely such as Erik 
Goldstein’s “First World War Peace Settlements”. Kaye Pasley’s PhD thesis “The Collapse of 
British Imperialism in Turkey 1919 to 1923” convincingly argues the British attempted to 
shape the Turkish peace terms in hopes of establishing imperial control over the region. 
Scholarship specifically concerning the British position on the Greeks, 1918-1923, is 
enriched by several leading contributions. Eleftheria Dalezious’s doctoral thesis “Britain and 
the Greek-Turkish war and settlement of 1919-1923” focuses upon the Greek occupation of 
Smyrna and its aftermath. Erik Goldstein’s article “Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-
1920”, as well as Karl Larew’s “Great Britain and the Greco-Turkish War, 1912-22” illuminate 
British policy to the Greeks, the former explaining the role of the Foreign Office’s Political 
Intelligence Department (P.I.D.) and the latter examining British Foreign Office documents 
from 1921-22 released fifty years later. The literature focusing upon the Armenians is heavily 
centred upon the events which occurred during the war to the Armenian community within 
the Ottoman empire. Helpful contributions used in this study are a recently published edited 
collection “A Question of Genocide Armenians and Turks at the End of the Ottoman Empire”, 
which includes articles from dozens of scholars, providing various perspectives on the history 
relating to Armenia, and leading historian Ronald Grigor Suny’s “A History of the Armenian 
                                                             
12 Alan Montgomery, ‘The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres’, p. 775. 
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Genocide”. In respect of British policy towards the Armenians, a useful article is Nazaryan 
Gevorg’s “British policy towards the Armenian question” between 1918 and 1919. 
On the Kurdish question David McDowall’s “A Modern History of the Kurds” proves 
the most thorough contribution. British policy towards the Kurds, however, benefits most 
from the work of Robert Olson. Olson’s book “The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism and the 
Sheikh Said Rebellion, 1880-1925” analyses the British policy towards the Kurds, and 
developments in Kurdish nationalism more generally, reviewing a range of documents from 
the UK Air Ministry, Colonial Office, and Foreign Office previously unused in any scholarly 
analysis. Although some of the claims of his Kurdish sources, such as those of Serif Ferat, are 
unverifiable.13 Olson’s article “The Second Time Around” analyses the British policy on the 
Kurds during 1921-22, including British consideration for support of a ‘Kurdish rebellion in 
Anatolia’, relying upon the UK Public Record Office and Colonial Office documents written by 
Lieutenant-Colonel A. Rawlinson.14 Olson’s work does, however, sometimes approach Kurdish 
nationalism with insufficient appreciation of the complicated and divided Kurdish collective 
identity. Elsa Tulin Sen’s PhD thesis provides a comprehensive overview of Anatolian Kurds’ 
national aspirations, although without strict focus upon the period in question. In relation to 
the Mosul vilayet, Saad Eskander’s article “Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The 
Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish Government, 1918-1919” provides a 
detailed exploration of early British policy towards Southern Kurdish autonomy, and his 
article “Southern Kurdistan under Britain’s Mesopotamian Mandate: From Separation to 
Incorporation, 1920-23” follows the subsequent developments within this catchment. Kerim 
Yildiz’s “The Kurds in Iraq” contributes a helpful background to the political dilemma facing 
Kurds in Iraq today. 
The most significant study on Kurdish identity is Martin van Bruinessen’s PhD 
dissertation “Agha, Shaikh and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan”, 
exploring the tribal, religious and nationalist political aspects of Kurdish identity and society. 
In contrast to Olson’s work, this tends towards a view of a weak Kurdish nationalism in the 
                                                             
13 [Serif Ferat] Robert Olson, The Emergence of Kurdish Nationalism, p. 27. 
14 Robert Olson, ‘The Second Time Around’ Die Welt Des Islam, 27:1 (1987), p. 91. 
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early twentieth century.15 Cuma Çiçek’s recent work “The Kurds of Turkey: National, Religious 
and Economic Identities” challenges the assumption of a homogenous Kurdish commune in 
Anatolia, exploring the cultural, linguistic, and religious diversity amongst the ethnic group. 
Malcolm Yapp’s “The making of the modern near east” provides a useful outline of the Kurdish 
and Armenian questions. Regarding British oil policy in the Middle East, two leading works 
include Helmut Mejcher’s “Imperial quest for oil: Iraq 1910-1928” and William Stivers’ 
“Supremacy and oil: Iraq, Turkey, and the Anglo-American world order, 1918-1930”. Various 
doctoral theses illuminate this subject, and, specifically, Fiona Venn’s recent article 
“Oleaginous Diplomacy: Oil, Anglo-American Relations and the Lausanne Conference, 1922-
23” highlights some of the issues directly addressed in chapter 5.2. In the English language, 
literature on the Turkish perspective is relatively limited, although Andrew Mango’s “Atatürk” 
and Erik-Jan Zürcher’s “A modern history of Turkey” provide attention to the Turkish 
nationalist view of Sèvres and the Turkish perspective during the Lausanne negotiations. 
However, this is beyond the scope of this study. Susan Pedersen’s work “The Guardians: The 
League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire” provides some insights into the emerging 
international dynamic of a fragile imperial system requiring rejuvenation through the guise of 
a “new” system. 
 Of the available primary literature, or insider histories, one of the most significant 
documents includes former British Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s “The Truth About the 
Peace Treaties”. In which Lloyd George ardently defends his positions, especially in relation 
to Greece. This included selective archival material purporting Allied unity on the positions 
for which he had drawn criticism, whilst the official archives remained closed.16 A more critical 
perspective is provided by Harold Nicolson, of the Foreign Office’s P.I.D. and a member of the 
Foreign Office delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. In “Peacemaking” he includes his 
private diaries, detailing his official duties at Paris, and in “Curzon: The Last Phase” he 
addresses Lord Curzon’s role as Foreign Minister, especially in the Lausanne negotiations, 
where Nicolson performed the role of adviser.17 Additionally, Arnold Toynbee, of the P.I.D., 
                                                             
15 Martin van Bruinessen, PhD Dissertation (1978) ‘Agha, Shaikh and State: On  the Social and Political Organization of 
Kurdistan’, Utrecht University, p. 70. 
16 Alan Montgomery, ‘The Making of the Treaty of Sèvres’, p. 775. 
17 Andrew Ryan, The Last of the Dragomans, Geoffrey Bles (London, 1951), p. 177. 
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adviser on Turkish affairs, and at the Paris Peace Conference, released a work of history in 
1922 entitled “The Western Question” concerning the contact of the Greek and Turkish 
“civilisations”. William Rupert Hay’s “Two Years in Kurdistan”, with assistance from British 
administrators in Mesopotamia and Southern Kurdistan Arnold Wilson, C. Rundle, F. de L. Kirk, 
Edward Noel and J. Miller, recounts his experiences working as a Political Officer in the 
Kurdish portion of present-day Iraq.18 In addition, Cecil Edmonds’ “Kurds, Turks and Arabs” 
provides further views of a civil administrator in Iraq. The most significant official documents 
available are contained in the project “Documents on British Foreign Policy”, edited by various 
historians and civil servants provided by the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs such as Rohan 
Butler and Ernest Woodward. “Series I, vols. IV, VII and VIII” relate to the Allied conferences 
which shaped the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. The “First Series Volume XVIII 1922-23” relate 
to the making of the Treaty of Lausanne, and “Documents on British Foreign Policy Series IA 
Volume I” pertain to the British policy on the Iraq-Turkish frontier. These collections 
predominantly include accounts of multilateral correspondences, relevant conferences and 
discussions between British and other Allied representatives. Additional primary material can 
be offered in the form of internal discussion between the Foreign Office, War Office, Colonial 
Office, and Admiralty in documents available as micro-films at the British Library in London. 
Large quantities of official British documents have also been digitised by the UK National 
Archives and are readily available for download. The treaties (Sèvres and Lausanne) are 
enclosed in Lieutenant Colonel Lawrence Martin’s “The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 vol. II”. 
Various documents, such as the “League of Nations Frontier Between Turkey and Iraq Letter 
and Memorandum from the Turkish Government” illuminates the case Turkey provided on its 
claims to the Mosul vilayet. 
 The events in question are well studied, however, there remains significant room for 
contribution. The literature possesses a palpable paucity of academic debate on the 
interpretations of British policy and the character of the British role in shaping the post-First 
World War Middle East. On the British policy towards the Greeks it is frequently argued, and 
essentially unchallenged, in the literature that Britain used Greece as a ‘proxy’ to protect the 
                                                             
18 William Rupert Hay, Two Years in Kurdistan Experiences of a Political Officer 1918-1920, Sidgwick & Jackson, Ltd (London, 
1921), p. vii.  
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Suez Canal and the British empire in India, and become the ‘predominant power’ in the 
Aegean Sea.19 Although there are numerous primary sources relating to the British policy on 
Armenia, the literature is much more focused on the policy of the United States. On the 
Kurdish question, the development of British policy is accentuated, however, scholars have 
failed to adequately illuminate the political divisions within Kurdistan and investigate whether 
Kurdish separatism was dominant. What is striking about the state of research is the lack of 
recent historiographical contributions and revisions, with significant portions of the 
secondary literature being published in the 1970s and 1980s. Robert Olson’s work is the latest 
comprehensive review of British policy towards the Kurds and his book was published in 1989. 
While new work on the Kurdish question is being released, this primarily concerns Kurdish 
identity and Kurdish nationalism, rather than detailed explication of the British policy towards 
the Kurds at Sèvres, Lausanne and afterwards, since this historical content has been assumed 
to have been researched to its full potential. The historiography establishes the differences 
between the British approach to Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian and Greek respective claims to 
sovereignty and independence, however, historians have arguably failed to fully explore the 
impact of ethnic bias and the idea of “civilisation”. Moreover, the role of religion, principally 
Christianity and Islam, is arguably sparsely emphasised as a factor, and comparative analyses 
regarding British policy towards each ethnic group has rarely been undertaken, in favour of 
isolated studies.  
                                                             
19 Erik Goldstein, ‘Great Britain and Greater Greece 1917-1920’, The Historical Journal, 32:2 (1989), p. 339. 
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1.3 Research design and methodology 
 
This research constitutes qualitative historical research based upon an extensive 
survey of the primary and secondary literature available. The concepts of civilisation and 
Orientalism (reference 1.1) provide an approach to which primary sources may be critiqued. 
The primary sources investigated in this thesis include archival material available in the British 
Library, catalogued as a collection of papers relating to Curzon as Foreign Secretary, 1919-24, 
with surrogate copies of official documentation available for public use in the form of micro-
films, observable with the use of internal British Library readers. Additionally, documents 
digitised by the National Archives, especially Cabinet Office documents, relating to British 
policy on the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds; the British documents on foreign policy 1919-
1939 series, primarily civil servant’s accounts of the relevant conferences compiled by teams 
of historians and civil servants; and a vast secondary literature, including numerous PhD 
dissertations, academic publications and supplementary journal articles and general texts. 
The material analysed will be treated critically. While official government documents will be 
handled, the potential for self-censorship, misinformation and propaganda will be 
considered. For instance, the analysis will consider historians’ use of sources, estimates and 
consider the limitations of relevant primary accounts. The sources analysed are limited to 
those in English language, however, this does not heavily impede an analysis of British policy. 
A study of British policy towards the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
14 
2 Background – British perspective on the late Ottoman empire and 
the emergence of a Turkish Republic 
 
The Ottoman empire was the foremost power in the Middle East during the medieval and 
early modern era, prior to its defeat in the 1683 second siege of Vienna and the resultant 
1699 Peace of Carlowitz. However, the empire was plagued by dwindling power, debilitating 
debt and, during its latter history, sustained through the protection of external powers.20 The 
Empire’s military weakness required protection against ambitious Ottoman vassals such as 
Mohamed Ali of Egypt who defeated the Ottoman Army in 1833 in Syria, only to be halted by 
Russian and Austrian intervention, and again in 1840, marching upon Anatolia until British, 
Austrian and Lebanese rebel forces repelled the Egyptian advance.21 For these reasons, the 
Ottoman empire earned the label, the “sick man of Europe”. The empire was also exploited 
by western privateers and constricted by a set of concessions to the European powers known 
as the Capitulations. The Capitulations granted ‘extraterritorial concessions to foreigners in 
commercial, judicial and criminal affairs’ as a result of ‘protégé communities’ and ‘increased 
foreign control in trade and economy’.22 The fragility of the Ottoman empire raised the 
prospect of potentially dangerous power vacuums opening up for Russia and Austria to 
exploit. This was first posed by Austrian Chancellor Klemens von Metternich at the 1822 
Verona Conference. This Conference had invited the new Conservative establishment in post-
Napoleonic Europe (the “Concert of Europe”), the Duke of Wellington representing Great 
Britain, to discuss a new “order” that it hoped to arrange. The eastern question concerned 
the instability of the Ottoman empire and the potential for Great Power conflict, especially 
between Austria and Russia in the Balkans, in attempts to fill these power vacuums left by the 
decaying Ottoman empire. This resulted in British and French protection throughout the 
nineteenth century as a buffer against ‘Russian expansionism’.23 This Anglo-Ottoman policy 
                                                             
20 Harry Luke, The Old Turkey and the New From Byzantium to Ankara, Geoffrey Bles Ltd (London, 1955), p. 22. 
21 Davide Rodogno, Against Massacre Humanitarian Interventions in The Ottoman Empire 1815-1914, The Emergence of a 
European Concept and International Practice, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 2012), pp. 23-24. 
22 Nevzat Uyanık, PhD Dissertation (2012) ‘Delegitimizing the Ottoman Imperial Order at the threshold of New Diplomacy 
(The Interplay of Anglo-American Policies on the Ottoman Armenians, 1914-1923)’, Princeton University, pp. 2, 11. 
23 Erik-Jan Zürcher, Turkey A Modern History Fourth Edition, I.B. Tauris (London, 2017), p. 45. 
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was founded upon the decision made by British diplomats Henry Temple (Viscount 
Palmerston), and Viscount John Ponsonby in the 1830s in favour of ‘the doctrine of the 
‘independence and integrity’ of the Ottoman empire’.24 
However, ethnicity and religion became features of increasing significance in the 
British official mind. British volunteers such as Lord Byron romanticised the cause of the Greek 
revolution of 1821, and the British Greek Committee of 1823 implored Government to assist 
their national liberation on the grounds of Europe owing a debt to ‘Ancient Greek civilisation’, 
‘Christian solidarity’ and ‘the expansion of British commercial transactions in the 
Mediterranean.’25 Nonetheless, British support for the sovereignty of the Ottoman empire 
was reinforced during the Crimean war, 1853-56. Prince Menshikov of the Russian empire 
threatened to occupy Moldova and Wallachia if the rights of Orthodox Christians were not 
protected, resulting in British and French forces allying with the Ottomans and defeating 
Russia. However, the arrangement in which Britain pledged to preserve Ottoman territorial 
integrity was heavily shaken when Ottoman forces suppressed Bulgarian nationalists in the 
“April uprising” of 1876. This event provoked widespread anti-Ottoman sentiment in Western 
Europe capitalised upon by anti-Muslim orators such as William Gladstone. Gladstone 
condemned the Conservative Party’s continued support for what Gladstone viewed as an 
Islamic empire slaughtering Christians, protesting that ‘‘all the Turkish authorities should walk 
out of the place’’, referring to the entirety of the majority Christian Balkans.26 This conflict 
escalated into the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878 when the Russian empire responded to 
the persecution of Christian minorities by invasion. The war was a resounding Russian victory 
and was concluded by the San Stefano Treaty of 1878, stripping the Ottoman empire almost 
wholly of its European territories.27 However, in accordance with the contemporary guiding 
balance of power doctrine, especially in respect of Russia, these Ottoman losses were 
                                                             
24 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire 1914-1921, Mansell Publishing Ltd. 
(London, 1987), p. 10. 
25 Maria Chatziioannou, ‘War, Crisis and Sovereign Loans: the Greek war of independence and British economic expansion in 
the 1820s’, The Historical Review, 10:1 (2013), p. 36. 
26 [William Gladstone] David Steel, ‘Three British Prime Ministers and the Survival of the Ottoman Empire, 1855-1902’, Middle 
Eastern Studies, 50:1 (2014), p. 48. 
27 Ibid., pp. 68-70. 
A study of British policy towards the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
16 
mitigated by the Treaty of Berlin, negotiated by the Concert of Europe, returning considerable 
areas in the Balkans back to Ottoman authority, including the southern half of Bulgaria.28 The 
“sick man of Europe” had retained a foothold in Europe, at least temporarily.  
During this period, the Ottoman Empire was threatened by separatists from Kurdish 
religious leader Sheikh Ubaydallah, as well as Greek Cretan and Armenian nationalists in 
Anatolia. Despite Ottoman success in the suppression of each of these nationalist 
movements, Crete was gradually released from Ottoman control and willingly granted its 
desired unification with Greece. Prior to the commencement of the First World War, the 
Ottoman empire descended into conflict with unified Italy over Libya in 1911, constituting an 
additional Ottoman defeat. This episode exposed the Ottomans’ military vulnerability, paving 
the way for the Balkan wars of 1912-1913 which the Ottomans were not prepared for 
‘militarily, politically or economically’.29 During the first war, the Balkan coalition devastated 
the deteriorating empire, yet, in the second war the Ottomans managed to re-gain territories 
in eastern Thrace from Bulgaria through the 1913 Constantinople Treaty. 
Nevertheless, the Ottoman empire, akin to its Austrian, Russian and Prussian 
counterparts, had been adapting to the circumstances of rising nationalist sentiment within 
its multi-ethnic dominions. Throughout the Ottoman empire diverse districts with multi-
ethnic, multi-religious and multi-cultural communities existed - in the words of Prime Minister 
David Lloyd George, a ‘medley of races’.30 While the Ottoman state ruled over its dominions, 
throughout its duration in large parts of the empire, the state’s power was ‘slight’.31 In the 
words of German secretary of state Arthur Zimmermann, the Sublime Porte (Ottoman central 
government) possessed ‘‘minimal influence’’ over ‘‘the more distant provinces’’.32 The 
Tanzimat reforms enacted between 1839-1876, encouraged under pressure from the 
Christian powers, progressively established a system of communal self-rule in which “millets” 
operated as separate religious courts with power over their respective religious communities. 
                                                             
28 Irfan Orga, Margarete Orga, Ataturk, Tombridge Printers Ltd (London, 1962), p. 9. 
29 Ibid., p. 44. 
30 David Lloyd George, The truth about the peace treaties volume II, Victor Gallancz Ltd (London, 1938), p. 1002. 
31 Erik-Jan Zürcher, Turkey A Modern History, p. 3. 
32 [Arthur Zimmermann] Ronald Grigor Suny, “They Can Live in the Desert but Nowhere Else” A History of the Armenian 
Genocide, Princeton University Press (Princeton, 2015), p. 333. 
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By 1900 there were 14 different Christian millets and a Jewish millet under the Grand Rabbi 
of Turkey.33 Furthermore, by 1863 a ‘sub-national constitution’ had been established by the 
Armenian community within the Ottoman empire and ratified by the Ottoman state ‘to 
specify the rules of religious and political governance in the community’.34 This did not 
institute total equality, though, as discrimination persisted against religious minorities in 
‘public employment, education, and taxation’.35 Demographically, in 1900, the majority of the 
30 million Ottoman residents were in the Balkans, and the majority of the territory under 
Ottoman rule was pre-industrial, where ‘subsistence farming and cyclic pastoralism were the 
dominant economic occupations for peasants and nomads in the countryside.’36  
The resilient Ottoman state, however, became increasingly estranged with Great 
Britain in the lead up to the Great War. In 1878 Britain took control of the Ottoman-ruled 
Cyprus and, in 1882, occupied Egypt.37 Meanwhile, although commercial projects between 
the Ottomans and the British and French predominated, the German construction of the 
Anatolian and Berlin-Baghdad railways signalled friendly relations between the Germans and 
Turks. This was to become increasingly significant as, in 1906, an Anglo-French pact brought 
Britain into an alliance with the Russian empire, arousing much Ottoman suspicion.38 The 
inclusion of Russia in the “Triple Entente” proved problematic for Ottoman and Committee 
for Union of Progress (CUP) statesmen. Once Minister of War Enver Pasha was confronted 
with the decision of which alliance to join, he declared that allying with Germany was the only 
way to ‘save’ them from becoming the ‘‘vassals of Russia’’.39 Following the turbulent 
diplomatic crisis of July 1914, Ottoman statesmen delayed the decision of placing itself in an 
alliance. The Ottoman-German alliance was negotiated between August-October 1914, with 
                                                             
33 Harry Luke, The Old Turkey and the New, p. 95. 
34 Bahar Rumelili, and Fuat Keyman, ‘Enacting multi-layered citizenship: Turkey’s Armenians’ struggle for justice and 
equality’, Citizenship Studies, 20:1 (2016), p. 70. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Uğur Üngör, The Making of Modern Turkey Nation and State in Eastern Anatolia, 1913-1950, Oxford University Press 
(Oxford, 2011), pp. 8, 11. 
37 Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914 The Ottoman Empire and the First World War, Cambridge University 
Press (Cambridge, 2008), p. 37. 
38 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 29. 
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Young Turk leaders hoping for a swift conclusive war in which the Empire could avoid pledging 
any troops.40 
Nevertheless, by 5th November 1914, all Allied countries had declared war on the 
Ottoman empire following its bombardment of Russia’s Black Sea coast. Crucially, during the 
war, numerous conflicting clandestine agreements were made between the Allies regarding 
the future of the Ottoman territories in the event of Allied victory. In March 1915, the 
Constantinople agreement between Britain, France and Russia established that the latter 
‘would be given Constantinople [Istanbul] and the Straits.’41 In April 1915 the “Treaty of 
London” persuaded Italy to defy their binding alliance with the Central Powers to support the 
Allies militarily, after being promised territorial gains in south-western Anatolia.42 In order to 
counterbalance Russia’s gains, France and Britain concluded the controversial Sykes-Picot 
agreement in March 1916, declaring zones of influence for the two powers within the 
Ottoman empire. This denoted an internationalised zone in Palestine, ‘French annexation of 
coastal Syria with an extended zone of influence in the interior, and British annexation of 
lower Mesopotamia with a similar zone of influence’ bordering the French zone.43 To add 
further complication, the border of these zones cut through the territory of Southern 
Kurdistan, with a French Area (A) wedged as a buffer between the British Area (B) and 
Russia.44 This agreement, however, was only intended to avoid conflict between the Entente 
powers by ‘designating areas of likely military occupation’.45 While Robert Johnson reduces 
the role of the agreement to ‘contingency planning’, considering its goal of counterbalancing 
the clandestine agreement for Russian annexation of Constantinople, this appears 
                                                             
40 Ibid., p. 153. 
41 Erik Goldstein, First World War Peace Settlements 1919-1925, Longman (London, 2002), p. 58. 
42 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians The League of Nations and the Crisis of Empire, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2015), p. 
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43 Paul Helmreich, From Paris To Sèvres The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919-1920, Ohio 
State University Press (Columbus, 1974), p. 7. 
44 Saad Eskander, ‘Britain’s Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish Government, 
1918-1919’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 27:2 (2002), p. 140. (Also see Figure 6) 
45 Robert Johnson, ‘The de Bunsen Committee and a revision of the ‘conspiracy’ of Sykes-Picot’, Middle Eastern Studies, 54:4 
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unconvincing.46 Mark Sykes was acting ‘upon definite instructions received from the Foreign 
Office’, and the Franco-British agreement can be interpreted as the original blueprint for 
British and French imperial designs for the Middle East, and was later used and modified by 
Allied leaders during the Paris Peace Conference.47 The agreement contrasted sharply with 
earlier British suggestions enclosed in the McMahon-Hussein correspondence of October 
1915 in which British representatives had informally endorsed the creation of an Arab state 
under Sharif Hussein of Mecca, in return for a Hashemite revolt against the Ottomans. This 
commitment was further undermined by the Balfour declaration of November 1917 in which 
the British cabinet communicated to Walter Rothschild, head of the Zionist Federation of 
Great Britain, their support for the creation of a “Jewish homeland” in Palestine. However, 
British policy was clearly uncertain as is palpable in the April 1915 De Bunsen committee on 
British policy in “Asiatic Turkey” following the war. This committee recommended that Britain 
should ‘avoid long-term’ occupation, investigate into how to deliver ‘local autonomy’ to the 
different ethnic groups with a satisfactory commercial arrangement ‘to satisfy all belligerent 
parties’.48 Through the duration of the war, British officials, especially T. E. Lawrence, firmly 
backed the idea of building up ‘a new Islamic empire’ under the Hashemite dynasty: ‘Hussein 
in Mecca, his younger son Faisal in Damascus, and his older son Abdullah in Iraq.’49 
Approaching the later stages of the war British officials began to reflect on its long-
term aims in a significantly more organised manner. The Foreign Office established the P.I.D. 
to this aim. Furthermore, colonialists prepared for an expansive role in the Middle East. For 
example, on March 29th, 1917, instructions from the War Cabinet were telegraphed to 
Baghdad and Delhi stating that ‘‘Basra… [is] to remain permanently under British Protectorate 
in everything but name. It will accordingly have no relations with foreign Powers… Baghdad 
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to be administered behind the Arab façade as far as possible as an Arab province by 
indigenous agency and in accordance with existing laws and institutions.’’50 
The Great War in the East concluded with the signature of the armistice of Mudros on 
30th October 1918 on board HMS Agamemnon. Britain was represented by Admiral Somerset 
Arthur Gough-Calthorpe and the Ottomans by Minister of Marine Affairs Rauf Bey.51 In the 
aftermath of the war, there were ‘1,084,000 British and imperial troops’ temporarily 
stationed in the Ottoman Empire, most notably forming the Allied occupation of 
Constantinople.52 British troops also occupied Syria, Mesopotamia, Southern Kurdistan, and 
British officers stationed in western Iran.53 The British Government had founded the P.I.D. in 
March 1918 who were officially tasked with ‘‘collecting, sifting and coordinating all political 
intelligence’’ or, as Erik Goldstein argues, tasked with considering Britain’s long-term war 
aims, effectively becoming the ‘nucleus of the British negotiating team at the Paris peace 
conference.’54 The Paris Peace Conference was convened by the Allied leaders to decide the 
terms for the defeated Central Powers. The Conference attracted momentous expectation 
from the various ‘colonised’ and ‘stateless’ delegations in attendance due to Woodrow 
Wilson’s supposed support for the ‘self-determination of all peoples’.55 However, it was to 
take a further year until the terms of the Ottoman peace treaty were seriously considered by 
the Allied partnership, as it was treated as secondary in importance to the German and 
Austro-Hungarian treaties. Before the German and Austrian colonies and Ottoman territories 
were absorbed by other colonial powers, the LN Mandate System was engineered by the 
Allied leaders (President Jan Smuts of the Union of South Africa being the principal architect). 
The Mandates were tiered by a class system indicating the mandate’s proximity to self-
determination. The phraseology of Article 22 of the Covenant of the LN on the Mandate 
System indicated the total authority of colonial powers until the colonial powers considered 
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the Mandate “ready” for independence, referring to ‘‘peoples not yet able to stand by 
themselves’ …and that ‘tutelage should be exercised by [the colonial powers] as Mandatories 
on behalf of the League’’.56 
The terms for Turkey were decided at a number of conferences with the input of 
various departments. The First Conference of London, 1920 discussed Turkey and the 
“eastern question”, along with other issues, making progress towards Allied unity on the 
settlement. At this conference British attitudes towards Turkey were vehemently 
antagonistic, with the intention of weakening Turkey’s power and drastically reducing its 
territory and inadvertently supporting the sovereignty of non-Turkish populations in Anatolia. 
On 26th February 1920, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George stated to the Allied leaders 
that ‘he proposed to say that one of the principles upon which the [Supreme] council had 
proceeded was to cut off from the Turkish Empire all regions inhabited by non-Turkish races: 
e.g., the Arabs, the Armenians, the Syrians, and the Kurds, as these latter were certainly not 
Turks.’57 At the San Remo Conference in April 1920, the terms were finally approved, and in 
August 1920 the Treaty of Sèvres imposed upon Turkey a “victor’s peace”, dismembering its 
empire and dividing all of its territories in Arabia between Britain and France, placing the 
Turkish Straits under international commission, creating an autonomous Armenia in north 
west Anatolia, a semi-Autonomous Kurdistan with possibility for succession in south-west 
Anatolia as well as putting Smyrna in South-West Anatolia under Greek administration.58 This 
followed Treaties imposed upon the other Central Powers, Germany, Austria and Bulgaria, 
whose territories were similarly reduced by the Allies, plunging German politics into debate 
over irredentism (especially relating to the Polish corridor, Danzig/ Gdansk, and the 
Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia). Simultaneously, the Greeks had deployed troops to occupy 
Smyrna, as agreed by the Allied leaders, further authorising a ‘Greek advance to Panderma’ 
(present-day Bandırma in north-western Anatolia, en route to Istanbul) at the Conference of 
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Hythe and approved at the First Conference of Boulogne in June 1920.59 In response, the 
Italians, uninformed of this decision by Greeks to occupy the zone they had been promised in 
1915 and for which their country had entered the war, occupied Antalya, on the 
Mediterranean coast of south-west Anatolia. The post-war settlement derived from the Paris 
Peace Conference was the final treaty to be affected. It was imposed on the Ottomans by the 
British and the French, with the French being the weaker of the two parties due to their 
previously uncompromising stance on Germany, and, besides Grand Vizier Damat Ferid Pasha, 
was signed by an irregular ensemble due to the Ottoman Government’s refusal to sign.60 
 In order to understand the development of the post-war political situation in Turkey, 
a variety of actors and events must be considered. Prior to the war, the “Young Turks” or 
“Unionists” of the CUP had predominated in the Ottoman Parliament following the 1908 
revolution against the autocratic Sultan Abdul Hamid II and consolidated total control of the 
Ottoman state in the coup d’état of January 1913. The Young Turk’s “three Pashas” who had 
led the Ottoman war effort had hastily fled Turkey subsequent to the signature of the 
armistice of Mudros. Whilst a new cabinet had been formed, the “Unionists” retained control 
of ‘Parliament, the army, the police force, the post and telegraph services’ and, despite their 
best efforts, the new regime’s purges could not practically replace the majority of these 
officials.61 It was wartime initiatives which had laid the foundations for an ‘armed resistance 
movement from Anatolia’ amid fears of British and French penetration of the Dardanelles and 
a potential fall of Constantinople.62 For example, the CUP established the “Karakol” (the 
guard), as well as regional ‘societies for the defence of the national rights’.63 
General Mustafa Kemal Pasha, later honoured by the title Atatürk, had been sent to 
eastern Asia Minor to ‘restore order’ in May 1919 as inspector-general of the Ninth Army.64 
By September 1919 the Sivas Congress, reproducing much of the work done in the 
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preparatory Erzurum Congress of July-August 1919, outlined a series of goals which came to 
be known as the “National Pact” and the Nationalist/ Kemalist movement.65 The movement 
had signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ottoman Government in October 1919, 
entitled the Amasya protocol. However, this was short-lived. This Nationalist movement was 
to become the key force in Turkish politics during the interwar period, garnering nationwide 
support during the May 1919 Greek invasion of Smyrna and the signature of the August 1920 
Treaty of Sèvres. The Turkish Nationalists had formed its government in Ankara as a response 
to the Allied decision to take the Ottoman Ministry of War, the Admiralty, and other 
departments under ‘Allied control, with the military effectively coming under British 
supervision’.66 The Nationalist movement’s stubborn rejection of the terms laid out in the 
Sèvres Treaty of August 1920 led the British to consistently support the Sultan until the 
October 1922 armistice of Mudanya. This was over a year later than the French and Italian 
recognition of the Turkish Nationalists’ legitimacy, with the French even acquiring ‘economic 
concessions’ from Turkish Foreign Minister Yusuf Kemal Bey in the Franklin-Bouillon 
Agreement.67 This was significant as it was after Greek forces had been defeated and had 
begun to retreat following the battle of the Sakaria river in August-September 1921, 
culminating in the Turkish capture of Smyrna a year later, marking a decisive Turkish victory. 
Henceforth, the Chanak crisis, the signature of the armistice of Mudanya, the Treaty of 
Lausanne and, finally, the settlement of the Turkish-Iraqi frontier transpired.  
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3 The Greeks – the stubborn British faction and the “Megali” idea in 
Anatolia 
 
In the aftermath of the Great War, British Prime Minister David Lloyd George cultivated a 
strong relationship with Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos and a sympathy for Greek 
ambitions in Anatolia. This was to be secured through Greek military occupation in May 1919 
as ‘authorized’ by Britain, France and the United States, and undertaken under British naval 
protection.68 In two meetings, first on 6th May 1919 between the Big Three, and the next day 
between Lloyd George and Venizelos, it was clear Britain had assumed leadership of the 
Smyrna operation. On the 6th May, Lloyd George stated to Wilson and Clemenceau ‘‘we 
should tell Mr Venizelos to send troops to Smyrna. We will instruct our admirals to let the 
Greeks land wherever there is a threat of trouble or massacre’’.69 Each of the Big Three 
confirmed no objections to the immediate action of this policy, and once Clemenceau asked 
‘‘should we warn the Italians?’’ Lloyd George answered a resounding ‘‘No’’.70 The following 
day, Venizelos recorded a conversation with Lloyd George in his diary in which Lloyd George 
stated ‘‘President Wilson, M. Clemenceau and I decided today that you should occupy 
Smyrna.’’71 The August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres was to  include the territory of Smyrna under 
Greek administration and, upon the majority vote of Smyrna’s local parliament, referral to 
the League Council and potential plebiscite, the ‘definite incorporation in the Kingdom of 
Greece of the city of Smyrna’.72 The Treaty allocated to Greece both Eastern Thrace ‘up to a 
few miles from Constantinople’ and ‘a sizeable enclave around Smyrna’, which was ‘Asia 
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Minor’s largest city and an important seaport on the Anatolian coast of the Aegean’.73 Action 
by the British was partly undertaken out of fear of Italian backlash, as they had been promised 
the city in a wartime agreement. 
 
 
The British position in respect of the Greeks exposes an ethnic bias sharply contrasting 
with British attitudes to the Turks. The defeat of the Ottoman empire posed an opportunity 
for the enactment of the longstanding “megali” (“Great”) idea which, in the words of John 
Kolettis, supposed that ‘‘the Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part, the smallest, 
poorest part of Greece.’’74 The bias towards Greek ethnicity is rooted in longstanding notions 
of historical “civilisation” and an ethnic “character” during this period. British diplomat Harold 
Nicolson reflectively stated ‘for the Turks I had, and have, no sympathy whatsoever… The 
Turks have contributed nothing whatsoever to the progress of humanity: they are a race of 
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Anatolian marauders: I desired only that in the Peace Treaty they should be relegated to 
Anatolia. Such… were the feelings… with which I went to Paris.’75 This attitude was mirrored 
in Lloyd George’s “The Truth about the Peace Treaties”: ‘Asia Minor for centuries made a rich 
contribution to the well-being of mankind. Under Turkish rule it made none of any appreciable 
moment.’76 Arnold Toynbee, the most senior assistant to Ottoman expert Sir Louis Mallet 
within the P.I.D., had served in various propaganda offices and contributed such articles as 
“The murderous tyranny of the Turks” to the New Europe journal.77  Toynbee suggested ‘‘the 
expulsion of Turkey from Constantinople may perhaps be regarded as a British desideratum 
on political grounds’’.78 Lloyd George also described the Turks with comparative contempt 
and the Greeks with admiration, claiming, in the most prosperous areas in the Ottoman 
empire, ‘the prosperity and productiveness of these areas were mainly due to the Greek 
settlers – peasants and merchants. They had been Greek in race and character and language 
for centuries before the Turk ever appeared in Anatolia.’79  
Other senior officials in the British Government were less enamoured with the Greek 
cause and expressed criticism of support for the Greek operation in Smyrna. The British War 
Office had warned that this would be an ill-fated strategy. Prior to the San Remo Conference, 
the General Staff of the War Office circulated a Memorandum to the Cabinet on the 1st April 
1920, a view they reaffirmed on 16th February 1921, making their criticisms of Lloyd George 
and his supporter’s championing of “Greater Greece” abundantly clear on political and 
humanitarian grounds: 
‘‘the General Staff, who are concerned only with British interests, have no desire to labour the 
Greek question, but desire to record their opinion that there will be no satisfactory settlement 
of the Turkish question until Greek ambitions are curbed… the General Staff are of the opinion 
that to persist in the present proposals for peace with Turkey, with existing forces at the 
disposal of the Allies, is to risk a great blow to British prestige without any corresponding 
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return, and probably to cause massacres of Christians and Armenians on a scale 
unprecedented even in Turkey.’’80  
In addition, on the 16th of February the General Staff maintained this view fiercely: 
‘the General Staff have always been strongly opposed to the invasion of Anatolia by Greece 
and have considered this to be the greatest source of irritation to the Turks, who regard it, 
not without reason, as a dishonourable breech of the Armistice.’81 In addition, further 
disagreement with British support for the Smyrna operation can be ascertained in a letter 
from Admiral Webb, stationed at Constantinople, to Sir R. Graham on 28th June 1919: ‘the 
increase of friction out here between Greeks and Turks… all dates back to the time of the 
occupation of Smyrna by the Greek troops… The fact is that the Turks are getting extremely 
frightened, and therefore also extremely dangerous’.82 The discourse from British detractors 
demonstrates political, military and strategic considerations dominated. 
However, there were also significant geopolitical and strategic considerations at hand. 
Greece, of the cases selected, was the only one which had an established state of any 
reliability. The British support for “Greater Greece” or the “Megali idea” manifested itself in 
Prime Minister David Lloyd George’s relationship with Greek premier Eleftherios Venizelos. 
The fact that Britain had suffered 722,785 military casualties (and over 100,000 civilian 
casualties) during the Great War meant that British public opinion was against engagement 
in further military activity.83 In this position, Britain encouraged Greece to expand its borders 
without risking British lives (by proxy, as Eleftheria Daleziou suggests).84 This is encapsulated 
in Nicolson’s description of British use for Greece: ‘‘politically she was strong enough to save 
us expense in peace and weak enough to be completely subservient in war.’’85 However, 
                                                             
80 General Staff of the War Office, IOR MSS Eur F112/290, ‘The Treaty of Sevres. General Staff views on modification of terms’, 
Secret, 16th February 1921, p. 2. 
81 Ibid., p. 1 (emphasis added). 
82 Ernest Woodward, and Rohan Butler, Eds., Documents on British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 First Series Volume IV 1919, p. 
655. 
83 Brian Bond, Ed., The Unquiet Western Front Britain’s Role in Literature and History, Cambridge University Press (Cambridge, 
2009), p. 24. 
84 Eleftheria Daleziou, PhD Dissertation (2002) ‘Britain and the Greek-Turkish War and Settlement of 1919-1923: The Pursuit 
of Security by ‘Proxy’ in Western Asia Minor’, University of Glasgow. 
85 [Harold Nicolson] Theo Karvounarakis, ‘End of an Empire’, p. 172. 
A study of British policy towards the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
28 
British officials were not in unison on the support for Greek goals. Large contingents within 
the Foreign Office and the War Office, despite supporting internationalising Constantinople 
and the Straits, ‘took sharp exception to Greek claims to western Thrace.’86 Unforeseen 
changes in the Greek leadership shocked British leadership and paved the way for the 
rethinking of their support for Greek goals. On 25th October 1920 the reigning monarch King 
Alexander died suddenly; on 15th November 1920, Prime Minister Venizelos lost the Greek 
election ‘to general surprise’, and on 5th December 1920 King Alexander’s father Constantine, 
perceived to be sympathetic to the Central Powers during the War, was reinstalled to the 
throne via referendum subsequent to the death of his reigning son Alexander.87 Lieutenant-
Colonel Guinness suggested the outcomes of these two democratic votes were primarily to 
choose ‘‘a King and Prime Minister who stand for a policy of peace’’.88  
The British were forced to adjust to the Greek army’s capitulation in Smyrna by 
September 1922.89 In spite of Greek military failure, domestically, September 1922 resulted 
in the “Greek revolution” which removed King Constantine from power. It led to the 
sentencing of six Greek military leaders and anti-Venizelist Prime Ministers to death and the 
installation of military rule. This was accompanied by a ‘renewed hope’ from Lloyd George 
that the achievement of Greek territorial aims was still possible.90 On 15th September, in an 
interview with the British Daily Mail Journalist Ward Price in a question regarding the 
possibility of the Allies refusing to ‘hand over Constantinople’, Mustafa Kemal stated: 
‘‘we must have our capital… and I should in that case be obliged to march on Constantinople 
with my army, which would be an affair of only a few days. I much prefer to obtain possession 
by negotiation though, naturally, I cannot wait indefinitely.’’91  
With the Kemalists approaching the Chanak fort, controlled by the British and perceived as 
‘the key’ to control the Straits and Constantinople, a war scare emerged. Prime Minister Lloyd 
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George and prominent Cabinet Ministers Winston Churchill and Austen Chamberlain were 
readily supportive of British military action.92 The Chanak crisis of September-October 1922 
had significant impacts upon British politics. Prime Minister David Lloyd George stood firmly 
against evacuating the British garrison at the Chanak fort, bringing the British empire to the 
brink of open conflict with the Kemalist forces in Turkey. This was not received well by the 
British public, and ultimately contributed to the withdrawal of Conservative support for Lloyd 
George’s post-war coalition government. As a result, Arthur Bonar Law succeeded as Prime 
Minister in 1922 and, following Bonar Law’s resignation in 1923, Stanley Baldwin as respective 
successor Prime Ministers. As such, the hawkish faction of British Government supporting 
Greek aims in Anatolia was removed and the “megali” idea was lost in the Treaty of Lausanne. 
At Lausanne, Britain, represented by Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon, approached the second 
round of negotiations of 1922-1923 with the objective of modifying the preceding treaty, 
whereas the Turkish delegation’s new chief negotiator, İsmet Pasha (later İsmet İnönü), 
intended to drive home a totally new and independent settlement for its united homeland. 
Thus, the strength of Turkish resolve forced the British abandonment of the “megali” idea. 
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4 The Armenians – sympathy without substance 
 
British policy towards the Armenians showed its role to be that of a supportive observer with 
positive attitudes towards the Armenians. The Armenians emerged from the Great War with 
strong western sympathisers following the revelations of atrocities committed against their 
population by the CUP/ Young Turks during the War.93 Significant evidence is provided by the 
conversations recorded in American Ambassador to the Sublime Porte Henry Morgenthau’s 
diary. The Ambassador had an established working relationship with CUP leaders Talât Bey 
and Enver Pasha and, in 1915, Morgenthau recorded that Minister of the Interior Talât Bey 
had shockingly exposed his ethnic cleansing programme: ‘‘our Armenian policy is absolutely 
fixed… we will not have the Armenians anywhere in Anatolia. They can live in the desert but 
nowhere else.’’94 In eastern Asia Minor and Cilicia (the lands within the Taurus and Amanus 
mountains), under the instructions of the CUP leaders, Armenians were systematically killed 
and displaced by an ensemble of Turkish, Circassian, Laz, muhacirs ‘of disparate nationality’ 
and Kurdish irregular forces.95  
Christian solidarity again became a component of British diplomacy, Armenia having 
been the first nation to collectively adopt Christianity.96 Ronald Suny aptly described the Great 
Power perception of Armenians as ‘far from the centres of civilisation’ but ‘an outpost of 
Christian culture.’97 David Lloyd George reflected that Armenia required Allied protection 
against Turkish misrule:  
‘it was obvious that we could not agree to any settlement which would leave the remnant of 
the persecuted population of Armenia to the cruel mercies of the race which had massacred, 
outraged and pillaged it for a generation and continued it through and right up to the end of 
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the War. But Armenia, with its depopulated and dispirited remnants, could not stand alone 
against the Turks on the one hand, and the Bolsheviks on the other.’98  
However, British policy towards Armenia was flimsy and British officials even 
distrusted what they perceived to be the “typical Armenian”. George Kidston of the Foreign 
Office stated ‘‘I fear that there is not the slightest doubt that the Armenian is at least as good 
a hand at massacring as his Moslem neighbour.’’99 The British negotiated armistice of Mudros 
with Turkey left the ‘six Armenian vilayets’ in Turkey’s possession ‘’subject to good 
behaviour’.100 In October 1918, Mark Sykes endorsed the idea of ‘a Cilician Armenia under 
French tutelage, a Kurdo-Armenia from the Black Sea down to Siirt and Urfa’.101 On 17th 
November 1918 British Lieutenant-General William Montgomery Thomson arrived in Baku 
with around 2,000 soldiers of the British Indian Army and ‘a detachment of Russian White 
Guard troops who were opposed to the Bolshevik Government’, essentially marking 
Thomson’s ‘governorship’ of the city until mid-1919.102 Lloyd George stated that there were 
170,000 British troops in ‘Russian Armenia, Caucasus and Syria’, although admittedly stating 
‘they were not going to maintain’ the troops in Armenia.103 On 22nd December 1919, Foreign 
Secretary Curzon had made clear to French General Henri Berthelot that establishing an 
independent Armenian state was ‘dear to Curzon’s own heart’, winning French approval.104 
Separately, much could be gained for Britain with the establishment of an Armenian state 
encompassing north-eastern Anatolia. However, the reality of limited resources and power in 
this corner of Anatolia, claimed by the increasingly organised Kemalist forces, dictated the 
abandonment of this policy. This was accepted with greater ease than with the Greeks in 
Anatolia.  
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 British intelligence, informed by American data, listed the Armenian population in Asia 
Minor (western Armenia) in 1914 as 1,520,000, with a total of 1,805,000 Armenians within 
the Ottoman empire (including Syrian vilayets, Turkish Thrace, and Constantinople).105 In 
1916, the Russian census indicated there were 1,784,000 Armenians in Russian Transcaucasia 
(eastern Armenia) which ‘probably included some refugees from Turkey’, which accounts for 
the British estimate of the Armenian population of 3,400,000.106 However, the British Foreign 
Office reported that, by 1920, the Armenian population had been reduced to an estimated 
2,000,000.107 Revelations of this extermination policy encouraged the anti-Turkish sentiment 
discussed in the preceding chapter, and developed sympathy with the Armenian cause. 
During the war, the British had extended financial aid to Ottoman Armenian 
dissidents. On 14th December 1917, for example, the Director of Military Intelligence carried 
out the will of the British War Cabinet, ‘promising assistance to the Armenians’ in which ‘the 
Armenian fraternity had collected a sum of between 5 and 10 million roubles, and giving 
figures for the cost of mobilising 20,000 men and maintaining 40,000 men for three 
months.’108 In addition, the Director of Military Intelligence himself stated ‘the most valuable 
help in this part of the world might be expected from the Armenians’.109 In 1918, as the 
Russian civil war ensued, the Armenian National Council (chaired by Avetis Aharonian) 
proclaimed the First Republic of Armenia in the Armenian majority area of the Caucasus 
region, former territory of the Russian empire. These circumstances led to attempts, 
especially by American President Woodrow Wilson and tentatively supported by the Allies 
(including Great Britain) to integrate north-eastern Anatolia with the new Armenian state to 
its north. The American ‘frontier for the future Armenian State’ was agreed upon on 28th 
March 1919 by British Foreign Office attaches Harold Nicolson and Arnold Toynbee.110 
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Significant portions of the Anatolian vilayets of ‘Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis’ were to 
be included in the Armenian state, with a significant outlet to the Black Sea.111  
 
 
Nonetheless, no Allied troops were provided to support the attainment of this goal, 
resulting in the Armenian’s reliance upon Armenian military leader Andranik’s volunteer 
force, comprising heavily of the American Armenian diaspora community, supported by the 
British Foreign Office.112 
 Following the war, the Armenians retained the sympathy of British and Allied 
policymakers and were given a significant portion of north-eastern Anatolia, attachable to the 
nucleus of the Armenian state established in the Caucasus. Politically, Britain benefitted 
significantly from this arrangement. As Paul Helmreich notes, this would ‘remove control of 
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the northern gateway to India from Turkey and provide a buffer against Russian expansion’.113 
However, due to the prevailing conditions, it was clear the establishment of an Armenian 
state would require significant ‘aid and advice of an economic, military, and political 
nature’.114 Georges  Clemenceau visited David Lloyd George on 11th December 1919 and, 
among other proposals, suggested the abandonment of the Armenia project, prior to the 
signature of the Sèvres Treaty.115 Regardless, Lloyd George, backed by the Foreign Office, 
rejected the idea that ‘the rise of Kemalism necessitated any drastic modification of allied 
plans.’116 
The circumstances by which an Armenian state in Anatolia could be established were 
jeopardised in late 1920. First, Mustafa Kemal’s nationalist army defeated a ‘predominantly 
Armenian French force in Cilicia’ in February 1920, foreshadowing the military outcomes of 
the next two years.117 The Turkish nationalists and the Soviets collaborated over free 
movement of arms, materials and men between Transcaucasia and Anatolia. Upon the 
conclusion of this agreement in September 1920, Kemalist forces invaded Armenia, claiming 
victory within 2 months.118 In the Caucuses, in the lead up to the October 1921 Treaty of Kars, 
agreeing the Turkish-Soviet border, the Armenian state in the former Russian empire had 
fallen to Soviet control.119 By September 1921, a Cabinet document on the “Second Assembly 
of the League of Nations” noted a policy in which the Armenia matter was placed firmly in the 
hands of the LN: ‘the Assembly urges the Council to press upon the Supreme Council of the 
Allies the necessity of making provisions in this [Turkish Peace] Treaty for safeguarding the 
future of Armenia, and in particular of providing the Armenians with a National Home entirely 
independent of Turkish rule.’120 In September the following year, the firmness of Armenian 
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independence was to wane in tone, as the following resolution added ‘in the negotiations for 
a peace with Turkey, the necessity for providing a National Home for the Armenians should 
not be overlooked, and requests the Council to take all steps which it may think useful to 
secure this result.’121 The General Staff of the British War Office, in proposing their 
modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres, were only concerned with ‘British interests’, and this 
pessimism is illuminated in a description of the political and military limitations and the 
dangers in supporting a weak Armenia in the face of the stubborn Turkish Nationalists 
claiming eastern Anatolia who possessed superior military capabilities: 
‘either the Allies or the Armenians would have to undertake military operations to drive out 
the Turks from such portions of Eastern Anatolia as may be granted to Armenia, and the 
maintenance of a large force to preserve the frontier, when gained, against Turkish attacks. 
These difficulties have now increased owing to the decrease of Allied forces throughout the 
world, and the late defeats of Armenia at the hands of Kiazin Kara Bekr. These defeats have 
shown the impossibility of Armenia winning unaided from the Turks such territory as may be 
granted to her, and the danger of supplying the Armenians with arms, which will only find 
their way into the hands of either the Turks or Bolsheviks. The General Staff are of opinion 
that, as no successful military operations can be expected, the only means whereby an 
independent Armenia can be formed is for the Turks and Armenians to come to some 
understanding on the formation of an autonomous Armenia under Turkish suzerainty, with 
certain Turkish guarantees.’122  
The General Staff essentially suggests no British effort should be committed to the promotion 
of an Armenian state at the Lausanne conference. Curzon’s addressing of the minorities 
question at Lausanne reflected this attitude, as on 12th December 1922 he stated: ‘‘the eyes 
of the world are on Armenia and Turkey, and the world will not be content that these 
wretched people should be left without any protection at the mercy of whatever the Turkish 
Government might be pleased to do… when we go away - and we may go away quicker than 
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you think – the whole world will look at what we have been saying and doing here during the 
last two days… The minorities problem excites more attention throughout the world than 
anything else, and by the manner in which it is solved, will this Conference be judged.’’123 In 
this instance, the Armenia question was used as a diplomatic tool to direct international 
opinion against the Turkish authorities which, according to Harold Nicolson, detracted from 
demarcation issues such as Mosul where international opinion tipped towards Turkey.124 
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5 The Kurds – experimental sovereignty of the lowest priority 
5.1 The Kurds of Anatolia 
 
Following the war, the Kurds in Anatolia appeared of little priority to the British, although 
British policymakers preserved their image as supporters of Kurdish independence. Unlike the 
Arab Hashemite leaders, Kurdish leaders were not encouraged to rebel against the Ottomans 
during the war and had little correspondence or prior experience with the British preceding 
the Sèvres Treaty. Political Officer William Rupert Hay admits, before the war, ‘the Kurd we 
had never heard of, or heard of only as the wildest of brigands.’125 Accordingly, British policy 
towards Anatolian Kurds in the immediate aftermath of the war was somewhat confused. 
Arnold Toynbee suggested ‘the transfer of Turkish Kurdistan to Iranian sovereignty on 
condition it was an autonomous province with foreign, presumably British, assistance’.126 The 
Treaty of Sèvres promised autonomy to the Kurds upon the referral of their case for 
independence to the LN, envisioned as being generated through a plebiscite of the Kurdish 
people in south-eastern Anatolia.127 In its construction, Prime Minister Lloyd George, and 
French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau had considered exercising ‘protectorates over 
portions of the country’, although both ultimately opted not to accept this commitment.128 
Whilst the Mosul vilayet could potentially opt for inclusion with the Sèvres Kurdistan 
(reference 5.2), Kurdistan’s territory was essentially restricted to Asia Minor. However, in the 
north of the French controlled Syria, and in northern Qajar Persia (later Iran) there resided 
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considerable Kurdish populations. These areas were included as part of Kurdistan by the 
exiled Muhammad Sharif Pasha in his submission “Memorandum on the Claims of the Kurd 
People” to the Paris Peace Conference.129 
 
However, following the war Kurdish nationalists developed both suspicion of foreign powers 
such as Britain, and disparate views of Turkish nationalism. As Malcolm Yapp outlines, there 
were three major problems entangled within the Kurdish question. First, ‘separating the 
Kurdish from the Armenian lands as the same lands were claimed by both groups and the 
populations were still intermingled even after the massacres of Armenians’; for various 
reasons the British could not attach Mosul to Kurdistan, yet, from a Turkish perspective, ‘a 
Kurdistan without Mosul would be a disturbing presence in the region’; and finally, ‘the 
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difficulty of finding representative Kurdish leaders’.130 Kerim Yildiz argues the search for 
representatives leaders was based upon the ‘unsubstantiated’ claim that no Kurdish leader 
was found which sacrificed ‘either his own or tribal interest for the greater purpose of the 
Kurdish nation.’131 As evidence for this, on 19th April 1920, Prime Minister Lloyd George 
rejected the notion of a Kurdish nation and disparagingly diminished their “national 
consciousness”: ‘‘it has never been clear what exactly the Kurds themselves preferred… I now 
have the impression that a Kurd does not represent any entity other than his own tribe… It 
seems that they have gotten used to rule by Turks.’’132 
While it is doubtful Lloyd George had any contact with any Kurdish leaders or Kurds 
generally, that Kurds were not in his view either homogenous or united appears clear.  Kurdish 
aghas (chiefs) such as Emin Ali Bedirhan rejected both the Kurdistan map presented at the 
Paris Peace Conference and Sharif Pasha’s legitimacy, with many trusting Mustafa Kemal’s 
movement with the protection of Kurdish lands against Armenian claims.133 Moreover, some 
chieftains sent telegrams to the Paris Peace Conference ‘claiming that they did not want 
separation from the Turks.’134 The Kurdish population was fragmented, after an estimated 
500,000 Kurds had died during both the war, and intertribal and interreligious violence in 
Anatolia after the war.135 Contrastingly, in early 1920 Kurdish ‘organisational meetings’ had 
been convened in Diyarbakir, Van and Bitlis, and by summer 1920, the east and northern 
portions of the Sivas vilayet were under the control of Kurdish forces.136 According to Serif 
Ferat, a Zaza Kurd of the Hormekli tribe, Miraley (Colonel) Halid Bey Cibran had begun 
organising Kurdish tribes in late summer 1920, in ‘Varto, Bularik, Malazgird, Hinis, Karliova, 
Solhan, Çapakçür’ and in July-August had seized Turkish armament shipments.137 By 
November 1920, a Kurdish rebellion began in Dersim (present-day Tunceli) and this 
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culminated in the Koçgiri rebellion, led by the former Kemalist officer Alişan Bey, chief of the 
Koçgiri tribe.138 Robert Olson argues the organisation of the Koçgiri rebellion developed from 
a correspondence between Alişan Bey and Mustafa Kemal himself. In their correspondence, 
Alişan Bey had informed Kemal that the Kurds were working for autonomy, to which he 
replied that all of Kurdistan had pledged to support him in the Erzurum congress of July-
August 1919.139 
On 15th November 1920, subsequent to a meeting of Kurdish leaders, a 
communication was sent to the Kemalist Government in Ankara seeking clarification of 
several points and demanding a swift response. This included Ankara’s confirmation of 
‘whether or not it accepted officially the promise of Kurdish autonomy as agreed to by the 
Sultan’s Government in Istanbul.’140 The Kurds then sent a further telegraph to Ankara on 25th 
November stating that if the ‘independent Kurdistan… stipulated in the Treaty of Sèvres, the 
tribal chiefs of western Dersim would take armed action’, to which ‘Ankara responded that it 
was in agreement’ whilst simultaneously reinforcing ‘government troops at Sivas’.141 A 
‘Kurdish revolution’ was planned in which the Kurdish flag would be raised at Hozat (Tunceli), 
however, this rebellion was postponed until spring 1921.142 This enabled the Kemalists to ‘co-
opt certain tribal leaders’, and appoint a number of prominent Kurds to the Grand National 
Assembly (Ankara) in an attempt to unite Anatolia using the guise of pan-Islamism.143 It is 
probable that the ultimate lack of cohesion and inferior organisational capacity of the tribal 
chiefs of Kurdistan in comparison to the modernised Kemalist forces influenced the British to 
restrain from providing military support to the Kurdish nationalists in Anatolia, despite having 
publicly supported the inclusion of Article 62 in the Sèvres Treaty. 
Nonetheless, Major Edward Noel, the principle British Officer in Kurdistan 1918-22, 
appointed by Arnold Wilson and travelling north and south of the armistice line, remained an 
enthusiastic supporter of the establishment of states to represent the Kurds. He argued 
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‘strongly for three Kurdish polities: Southern Kurdistan based on Sulaymaniya and embracing 
Nihri, Rawanduz, Arbil, Kirkuk, Kifri and Khaniqin; Central Kurdistan, centred on Mosul, and 
Western Kurdistan centred on Diyarbakir and stretching as far north as a Kurdish majority 
persisted, all implicitly enjoying British protection and advice.’144 A series of Kurdish 
insurrections occurred against the British authorities south of the armistice line (reference 
5.2), and British support for Noel’s ideas waned. In the Foreign Office, Noel was frequently 
referred to as the “Second Lawrence”, to infer his romanticism for the causes of tribal peoples 
alike “Lawrence of Arabia”.145 In Anatolian Kurdistan, Noel became the confident of the 
notable Bedir Khan Kurdish family. 
Mustafa Kemal insisted there was intelligence that the British were planning to 
organise an attack on Turkish forces at Sivas with Kurdish rebels.146 Indeed, preparations were 
being made by the British in planning a Kurdish revolt against the Turks ‘on the same scale as 
the Arab Revolt’, principally promoted by Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur Rawlinson, although 
these proposals were shut down as problematic towards the Armenians and Turks, with some 
having colonial considerations in mind. For example, diplomat Reader Bullard fearing ‘armed 
action against Turkey would be interpreted in some quarters as antagonistic to Islam’.147 This 
fear was of causing offense to the Muslim population of British India. 
As stated in the Treaty of Sèvres, the deadline for the opportunity for Anatolian Kurds 
to apply for Kurdish independence to the LN was 10th August 1921, one year following the 
signing of the Treaty. As this was fast approaching, during the March 1921 Cairo Conference, 
British Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill and supporting staff Major Noel and Hubert 
Young ultimately ‘agreed that a Kurdish state ought to be set up without delay’.148 
The Kurds were arguably the most neglected group by the British delegation to the 
Lausanne Conference. Eric Forbes Adam, First Secretary to the Foreign Office, anticipated on 
11th March 1922 that the French should require ‘nothing more than the European minority 
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clauses’ at Lausanne, and thus schemes to pressure Turkey to support ethnic Greeks 
remaining in Asia Minor were elaborated, with no concern for Kurdish independence.149 
Othman Ali argues Lord Curzon was enabled to abandon the Kurdish articles of the Treaty of 
Sèvres in order to bring Turkey into the LN and isolate Bolshevik Russia.150 Kurdish nationalist 
activities following the Treaty of Lausanne were led by the secret organisation established 
between 1921-23 called the Ciwata Azadi Kurd (Society for Kurdish Freedom, or Azadi). The 
Azadi was principally tasked with obtaining ‘British assistance’ for ‘their cause’.151 While no 
evidence has been found to suggest British considerations of supporting Kurdish rebels in 
Anatolia 1921-23, in September 1924, the Beyt Şebab mutiny of over 500 Kurdish officers 
impressed British officials.152 
 In post-Lausanne Turkey, Kurdish nationalism in the Anatolian quarter of Kurdistan 
received religious reinforcement as Mustafa Kemal began to advance secular reforms in the 
new Republic. This culminated in the 1925 rebellion led by the Azadi and Sheikh Said, of the 
Naqshbandi branch of the Sufi order of Islam, calling for a Kurdish state ‘where the Islamic 
principles, violated in modern Turkey, were to be respected.’153 The uprising was brutally 
suppressed by the Turkish Government. Tens of thousands of peasants were killed, although 
no official figures are available, with ‘large-scale deportations of Kurdish people’ to disperse 
them to western and central Turkey.154 The handling of this rebellion ultimately highlighted 
the divisions between Turks and Kurds and undermined the Turkish claims to the Mosul 
vilayet which, according to British intelligence, was home to 450,000 Kurds.155 The Turkish 
claim that ‘‘the Turks and Kurds are indivisibly united by racial affinity’’ was no longer 
convincing.156 This precipitated the December 1925 League Council decision to proclaim the 
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Mosul vilayet’s retention in the British mandate of Iraq.157 Thus, Britain accepting Turkish 
control of Anatolia and the increasing secularism of Mustafa Kemal’s Government provoked 
a divided Anatolian Kurdish population to support separatism. The Said rebellion thus helped 
enable Britain to retain the Mosul vilayet within the boundary of Iraq. 
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5.2 The Kurds in the Mosul vilayet and British policy. 
 
Prior to the creation of the British mandate of Iraq, between 1918-1920, Britain had explored 
options for Kurdish autonomy in the Mosul vilayet, part of Southern Kurdistan. Although this 
gradually turned towards direct rule. Three pre-eminent figures were involved in the 
construction and implementation of British policy in the Mosul vilayet (with instruction from 
London): Major Edward Noel, the main Political Officer in Kurdistan, a sympathiser with 
Kurdish nationalism; Percy Cox, High Commissioner of Mesopotamia, an advocate of Kurdish 
inclusion in an Arab state; and Arnold Wilson, acting Civil Commissioner, a proponent of 
Kurdish autonomy within Mesopotamia. This area constituted the frontier between the 
Ottoman empire and Qajar Persia (later Iran). Historically this had been the only split within 
Kurdistan until the post-First World War re-drawing of the Middle Eastern political map and 
had essentially been an open border since the sixteenth century.158 Although the Mosul 
vilayet, predominantly Kurdish in population, was divided into separate French and British 
“Areas” in the Sykes-Picot treaty, the Bolshevik revolution removed the strategic necessity for 
a French buffer between Russia and the British southern zone. 
Thus, British troops occupied the zone with intention of forcing France to ‘accept de facto 
British control’ over the complete Mosul vilayet.159 Mosul was occupied by British forces in 
Autumn 1918, shortly after the armistice agreement, considered by Turkish authorities as 
illegal, but defended by the British as ‘in full conformity with the terms of article 16’.160 Whilst 
fundamentally retaining the French promise of Syria vis-à-vis the Sykes-Picot agreement, in 
December 1918 French Prime Minister Georges Clémenceau ‘consented to cede to England, 
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Mosul’.161 At first, in late October-early November 1918 this area constituted an autonomous 
Kurdish ‘entity’, with Sulaymaniya as its capital, ‘under British political supervision’.162 
 
 
Figure 6 (above) Map of Sykes-Picot spheres of influence in Southern Kurdistan in Saad Eskander, 
‘Britain's Policy in Southern Kurdistan: The Formation and the Termination of the First Kurdish 
Government, 1918–1919’, p. 140  
Mesopotamia, accounted for by the Ottoman vilayets of Baghdad and Basra, had been 
occupied by the British since March 1917. Mesopotamia came under direct British control 
following the conclusion of the Great War. However, in the northerly Mosul vilayet the British 
initially decided upon indirect control and fostering friendly relations with the population. 
This began in May 1917 when ‘British political officers established relations with chiefs in Tuz 
Khirmatu, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniya.’163 Considering British policy on the “southern Kurds” 
whilst visiting Sulaymaniya in December 1917, Arnold Wilson had decided against proposals 
for ‘a free Armenia in the northern provinces of Turkey… provided an independent Kurdistan 
                                                             
161 Elie Kedourie, England and the Middle East, p. 133. 
162 Jordi Gorgas, ‘Urban Mobilization in Iraqi Kurdistan during the British Mandate: Sulaimaniya 1918-30’, Middle Eastern 
Studies, 44:4 (2008), pp. 537-552. 
163 David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, p. 118. 
A study of British policy towards the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
46 
was established between an Armenian and an Arab State.’164 In October 1918, Mark Sykes 
promoted the creation of ‘an autonomous Southern Kurdistan excluding Kirkuk, Altun Kupru 
and Arbil where the largest urban communities were Turkomen’, as to strive for a 
homogenous Kurdistan.165 
In 1918, British officials were invited into Sulaymaniya by Kurdish leader Sheikh 
Mahmud Bazanji for ‘political and administrative advice’.166 On 1st December 1918, Arnold 
Wilson, as acting Civil Commissioner, ‘visited Sulaymaniya and met the sheikh [Mahmud] and 
about 60 chiefs of Southern Kurdistan, including major ones from across the Iranian 
border.’167 It was recorded that there was ‘virtual unanimity that the Turks should not return’, 
a ‘general recognition of the need for British protection’, however, a palpable scepticism of 
the British remained.168 Some were unconvinced of the ‘wisdom of allowing Britain to 
administer Kurdistan’, and ‘others insisted Kurdistan must be separated from Iraq and directly 
administered from London rather than Baghdad, clearly hoping to return to the freedom they 
had enjoyed when ruled from Istanbul.’169 Major Edward Noel was tasked with the promotion 
of nationalist over pan-Islamic movements, whilst informing the Kurds ‘it was not Britain’s 
intention to impose upon them ‘an administration foreign to their habits and desires’.170 
British policy was centred around rewarding agency, as: 
‘Kurdish aghas were given appointments as district governors… with authority over (also 
Kurdish) gendarmes… these gendarmes were often used as the aghas’ private armies. Even 
when the deliberate policy of indirect rule in Kurdish districts was discarded, the British 
continued to pay salaries to the “loyal” chieftains, thus strengthening their positions.’171 
However, by April 1919, Arnold Wilson’s attitude towards Kurdish statehood took a 
manifestly negative turn, stating the Kurds ‘within the economic orbit of Mosul and Baghdad’ 
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were fully aware that ‘clean ethnographic borders were strategic and economic nonsense’.172 
This certainly accounted for the advent of smuggling across the new Kurdish borders. 
However, this sentiment reveals a profoundly pessimistic attitude towards a distinctly Kurdish 
autonomy amongst British policymakers. Sheikh Mahmud was appointed as Governor of the 
‘Kurdish Area B, extending from south of the Lesser Zab River to the old Ottoman-Persian 
frontier’.173 Nevertheless, in June 1919, after British troops had begun to withdraw in droves, 
Mahmud led a Kurdish rebellion which involved the arrest of all British persons in 
Sulaymaniya, and the proclamation of Kurdish independence under Mahmud’s leadership.174 
However, ‘even neighbouring towns like Kifri and Khaniqin disowned him, let alone important 
nearby tribes like the Jaf.’175 As a result, the uprising was suppressed and Sheikh Mahmud 
was captured and deported. In the short-medium term, this disturbance did not entirely 
overthrow the prospect of Kurdish autonomy. Although, British policymakers began to 
perceive the Kurdish ‘less favourably’ as a ‘troublesome people’ with ‘unreliable leaders’.176  
Although in January 1919 acting civil commissioner for Mesopotamia Arnold Wilson 
recounted that there had been installed ‘‘an independent Southern Kurdish state under 
British auspices’’, he himself had possessed the longstanding belief that the Mosul vilayet 
should be incorporated into Mesopotamia as an ‘autonomous province’.177 In August 1920, 
the Treaty of Sèvres made provision for the ‘voluntary adhesion’ of ‘what had hitherto been 
the Mosul vilayet’ within the ‘independent Kurdish state’ set to include south-eastern 
Anatolia.178 By 1921, the stipulation of inclusion of the Mosul vilayet with an independent 
Kurdish state (and potential support of a Kurdish rebellion) loomed upon British policymakers. 
Colonial Secretary Winston Churchill, however, rejected Percy Cox’s suggestion to 
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‘‘encourage Kurds to [be] aligned with Greek forces, against the perceived Turkish threat to 
Iraq.’’179  
The creation of the British Mandate of Iraq on 25th April 1920, and the temporary 
placement of Mosul within the territory, created complications with view to the province 
being claimed by representatives of both the Kurdish and Turkish communities.180 Security 
concerns over the increasingly antagonistic relationship Britain had cultivated with the new 
Turkish Government became pervasive. Due to Turkish claims, the issue remained essentially 
unresolved and unnegotiated until after the Lausanne Conference. The vilayet of Mosul was 
the only issue not resolved at the Lausanne negotiations between Turkey and the British 
empire. The Treaty of Lausanne itself postponed the issue and established that it was to be 
referred to the LN. The Turkish nationalists claimed self-determination for both Turks and 
Kurds, invoking their historical rule over the vilayet and explaining the importance of the 
vilayet in connecting Anatolia with Syria and Persia.181 According to Andrew Mango, İsmet’s 
primary considerations for fighting ‘tenaciously’ for Mosul were its oil deposits and the 
possibility of exacerbating Kurdish separatism within Turkey between the separated 
secessionist Kurdish movements.182 These concerns, combined with a significant expenditure 
on the protection of Iraq was of political consequence. On 20th February 1923, former Prime 
Minister Asquith urged Prime Minister Bonar Law to withdraw Britain from ‘any obligation in 
Iraq’.183 
Despite these budgetary alarms, oil had become an increasingly significant factor in 
British policy in the Middle East, which applied heavily to Mosul’s inclusion in Iraq. Oil was 
first struck in Baku, Azerbaijan in 1846, then again in Abadan in Persia, 1911. Prior to the First 
World War, Jackie Fisher’s tenure as First Sea Lord, 1904-1910, had propelled the transition 
from the Royal Navy’s reliance upon coal-fuelled destroyers towards oil-burning destroyers, 
on the grounds of efficiency and reducing the Naval budget, paving the way for increasing 
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reliance upon oil for the British Naval fleet.184 Considering this demand from the Royal Navy, 
the prospect of oil in Mosul was something Britain was intent upon securing. Susan Pedersen 
highlights that a German technical commission in 1901 had commented that Mosul ‘was a 
veritable ‘lake of petroleum of petroleum of almost inexhaustible supply’’.185 Moreover, 
Cabinet Secretary Sir Maurice Hankey, the most senior UK civil servant,  informed Foreign 
Secretary Arthur Balfour in 1918 that ‘‘oil in the future would be as important as coal is 
now’’.186 Helmut Mejcher emphasises the Cabinet Secretary’s receptiveness to the ideas of 
Admiral Sir Edmond Slade, the Admiralty’s oil expert, leading to oil becoming central to Lord 
Curzon’s ambitions at Lausanne negotiations.187 Andrew Ryan, present at the Lausanne 
Conference, observed that ‘much time’ was expended upon ‘economic and financial 
questions’.188 The Turkish Assembly tactfully used the commercial value of Mosul to its own 
advantage, in signing a concession on 9th April 1923 to the American “Chester Group” relating 
to ‘railway and mineral rights’ in an area encompassing Mosul.189 This would bring American 
commercial rivalry to the centre of British policy, as America intended to ‘ensure an outcome 
that was both favourable to American interests’ and ‘preserved’ the ‘open door’, under either 
British or Turkish rule of the Mosul vilayet.190 
Publicly, British representatives concealed their interests in the province of Mosul. On 
12th February 1926 former French Prime Minister Joseph Caillaux twice ‘anxiously’ posed the 
question to British secretary Eric Phipps whether he ‘considered the possession of Mosul to 
be vital for the British empire’, which Phipps twice replied ‘I did not consider it to be vital for 
the British empire, but that it was certainly vital for the Kingdom of [Iraq], for whose welfare 
Great Britain, as mandatory of the League, was responsible.’191 The security of Iraq was a 
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factor in British discourse, as on 20th October 1922 B. B. Cubitt of the War Office wrote to the 
Foreign Office that the incorporation of this province into the new Kingdom provided for a 
‘reasonable distance’ between Baghdad and ‘the Turks’.192 In private correspondences to 
Foreign Secretary Marquess Curzon, Prime Minister Andrew Bonar Law expressed concern 
over potential conflict over the Turkish-Iraqi border. On 28th December 1922, Bonar Law 
worriedly wrote to Curzon that ‘to judge by the papers it looks as if it were possible that the 
Turks might seize upon Mosul as the ground upon which to break it. This would be the most 
unfortunate thing which could happen in every way as half of our own people and the whole 
of the world would say that we have refused peace for the sake of oil.’193 On the 8th January 
1923, during the Lausanne negotiations, Bonar Law declared to Curzon that Great Britain 
‘should not go to war for the sake of Mosul’.194 However, the veracity of Phipps’ rejection of 
British vital interest is questionable. On the 1st May 1920 Winston Churchill, in his capacity as 
Secretary of State for Air and War, after referring to the ‘pacification of Kurdistan’, judged 
that military expenditure should not exceed £5,000,000 where civil expenditure should 
remain below £2,000,000 in view of the ‘capital charges’ associated with oil extraction, 
although suggesting a ‘future profit’ might ‘be drawn from the Mesopotamian oilfields’, with 
prospects of ‘thoroughly good business for the British Empire.’195 It is abundantly clear that 
the British were intransigent on the issue of Mosul from a confidential letter, dated 20th 
October 1922, from the Under Secretary of the Admiralty to the Under Secretary of State for 
the Foreign Office on the revisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, recommending that ‘no 
modification of the Mesopotamian boundary with Turkey should be made which would 
jeopardize our control over the oil-fields or pipe-lines’.196 
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The Cairo Conference of 1921 opened debate for British policy on the autonomy of 
Southern Kurdistan. Gertrude Bell, Oriental Secretary, and Percy Cox, High Commissioner of 
Iraq, argued that ‘the Southern Kurds would accept Arab rule’, whereas Noel and Wilson 
disagreed, Wilson attempting to ‘incorporate the Kurdish areas into British-administered 
Mesopotamia’ due to its ‘economic richness’ – ‘considerable surplus in wheat production, 
lumber, fruits, tobacco and most importantly, potential oil wealth.’197 By 1920, Iraq, and the 
Kurds within the vilayet of Mosul, were engaged in insurrections against British rule. The mass 
revolt was suppressed successfully with use of the newly established Royal Air Force (RAF). 
Following the restoration of British authority in 1921, the Hashemite leader Faisal, removed 
from rule by French forces in Syria, was invited to the thrown of Iraq. As a Sunni Muslim from 
the Hedjaz, he was a hard sell to the people of Mesopotamia and, thus, Faisal proclaimed 
support of pan-Arabism. This was of great concern for the Kurds and widened divisions 
between Arabs and Kurds in Iraq, as a plebiscite designed by Percy Cox revealed the majority 
of people in the Kurdish areas of the Mosul vilayet were against inclusion with Iraq and Arab 
rule in Southern Kurdistan.198 Percy Cox argued the Kurds, ‘unlike the Arabs, had neither a 
sense of nationality nor political reliability’ and, ‘as he found no sizeable support among 
Kurdish notables for his incorporation alternative, Cox excluded them from any discussion 
concerning their future’.199 The British, however, viewed this as useful to controlling the new 
Iraqi Government under Faisal, since ‘the hostile attitude of the Kurds towards the new Iraqi 
Government was not in fact altogether unwelcome; it was a constant reminder to Faisal and 
his friends that... Britain might express her consent to Kurdish independence’.200  
Anglo-Turkish rivalry ultimately provoked the use of the Kurds by both sides to 
undermine each’s authority, despite offering little autonomy to the Kurds themselves. Robert 
Olson describes British policy towards the Kurds after the mutiny of Beyt Şebab in 1924 as ‘a 
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diplomatic, political, and military instrument against the Turks’.201 On 5th November 1925, a 
memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies Leo Amery to the British Cabinet 
entitled “Iraq and the Mosul Question” stated that:  
‘The only ethnic element which crosses the frontier are the Kurds, who inhabit the 
northeastern mountainous part of the vilayet and constitute an actual majority of its 
population... The idea of a Kurdish national State, including the Kurds of Turkey, Iraq and 
Persia, as a kind of Asiatic Switzerland may be theoretically attractive, and was toyed with at 
the time of the Treaty of Sevres. But it is not a practical possibility, and apart from it there is 
no reason either of sentiment or of material interest which would justify any transfer of the 
Kurds of Iraq from a State where they are content and enjoy a considerable measure of 
autonomy and special consideration, to Turkey, where their religious and national interests 
would bring them into direct collusion with the fanatically Turkicising and anti-religious policy 
of Angora.’202 
In this memorandum, Amery suggests granting Mosul to Turkey is against Kurdish interests, 
referring to the religious discontent of the Said rebellion in February. As this was accepted by 
the League Council, on 30th May 1926, Turkey settled for ‘10% for 25 years’ of the revenue 
from Mosul oil, thus relinquishing their claims to the province and ending the dispute.203 
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6 Conclusion. 
 
Prior to the First World War, the British empire had opted for the protection of the Ottoman 
empire due to British geopolitical and strategic interests. However, once the British and 
Ottomans became belligerents on opposite sides of the war, Britain, France and Russia 
decided upon partitioning the Ottoman dominions between themselves. Once the armistice 
of Mudros was signed, the Paris Peace Conference presented an opportunity to strengthen 
Britain’s position in the eastern Mediterranean and in the Middle East through support for 
the design of friendly states and re-drawing the political map of the territory within the 
former Ottoman empire. Although, the Allies agreed not to mention partition in the text of 
the treaty.204 The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres allocated large portions of the former Ottoman 
empire to autonomous ethnically organised polities, and saw Greece extending its state 
authority to south-western Anatolia. An analysis of the British discourse and decisions 
involving the Greeks in Anatolia reveals contrasting objectives of the War and Foreign Offices. 
The prevailing faction under Prime Minister David Lloyd George perceiving the Greece and its 
Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos as reliable allies. This contrasted with the British 
conception of the Turks, who were regarded as brutish and corrupt. Long-standing Orientalist 
thinking aided this notion, as senior British officials involved in post-war British policy on 
Turkey such as Arnold Toynbee had published anti-Ottoman, pro-Greek propaganda during 
the war. This perception was the principle upon which British policymakers attempted to use 
Greece, by proxy, to establish British supremacy in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern 
Mediterranean with the objective of protecting other valuable British dominions and overseas 
possessions such as the Suez Canal, Cyprus, the Abadan oil refinery and, ultimately, India. This 
policy, as can be ascertained from the warnings of the General Staff of the War Office, was a 
known risk and yet it was still backed heavily by the British Government. Of the three cases 
analysed, Greece is the only state pre-existing the Great War, with established forms of 
governance in western Thrace (south-eastern Europe) with an organised standing army. 
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In contrast, the Armenian people inherited devastation from the extermination and 
deportation policies targeting their population during the war, possessed exceptional military 
weakness and required Allied protection. Britain did not wish to expend further resources on 
another mandate. However, it eagerly lobbied the United States of America to take on the 
responsibility whilst deciding against the long-term British occupation of Armenia. Ultimately, 
the rising strength of Kemalist forces meant the Armenian independence foreseen in the 
Sèvres Treaty was no longer viable. This factor similarly manifested as the primary obstacle 
for Greek and Kurdish independence in Anatolia. However, even after the military failure of 
the Greeks the British faction under Lloyd George persisted in the possibility of Greek 
authority over portions of Anatolia. This was not the case for the Armenians and the Kurds. 
British policy towards the Kurds in Southern Kurdistan was first tempered with 
caution, with no direct control taken until Sheikh Mahmud Bazanji’s 1919 uprising in Southern 
Kurdistan. In Anatolia, although mobilisation of the Anatolian Kurds against Kemalist forces 
was considered, it was never attempted as it did not compliment the wider British plan for 
the layout of Anatolia. This layout prioritised Greek military success. Major Edward Noel and 
others explored the possibility of military support to the Kurds within Anatolia, however, the 
rise of Kemalism and British support for the Greeks dictated that the British would not further 
antagonise Turkey in sponsoring an additional separatist movement. The outcomes of 
Lausanne emphasise how by 1923 Britain was not committed to the Armenian and Kurdish 
causes in Anatolia, since their sovereignty was diminished to the recognition of minority 
rights.205 Nonetheless, following the Lausanne Treaty of 1923, the Kurds in Anatolia became 
a tool to be used against the Turks as the Kurds within the Iraq mandate did against the British. 
As Kurdish resistance to British rule in the former Mosul vilayet increased, budgetary 
considerations entered the discourse, leading some British politicians to suggest withdrawal 
from Iraq altogether. However, with the advent of aerial bombing and the RAF, the Air 
Ministry managed to exercise effective control over the territory of Iraq and the strategic 
importance of Mosul’s oil deposits outweighed the costs in the mind of British policymakers. 
                                                             
205 See Articles 37, 38, and 39 of the Treaty of Lausanne (1923) in: Lawrence Martin, The Treaties of Peace, pp. 970-972 (see 
appendix 7). 
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The preceding chapters reveal a picture of a web of experimental policies attempting 
to exploit and promote pre-existing nationalist fervour within the former Ottoman empire for 
the British empire to secure favourable political and commercial circumstances for itself and 
the other Allied powers. Although Armenian nationalism had become a matter of survival, 
Greek nationalism in Smyrna was not dominant due to the multiculturalism of the city, and 
Kurdish nationalism up to this point was far from unopposed within Kurdish society. The 
British priority was placed on the territories it occupied following the war, including the 
mandate of Iraq and exploring calls for self-determination where they complimented British 
interests. Moreover, the idea of civilisation and the difference between the “Oriental” and 
“European” appears to have contributed to an ethnic hierarchy, a palpable influence over 
British policymakers. The Greek example highlights the extent to which ethnic bias could have 
a role in active British foreign policy. In contrast, the case of the Ottoman Armenians 
demonstrates the limit to which ethnic bias effected active British foreign policy in 
circumstances in which there were no significant strategic, geopolitical or economic forces 
present. Collectively, however, early British support for each ethnic group’s authority over 
the claimed portions of Ottoman territory can be linked to a concerted effort to weaken the 
Turkish state. 
The British policy of controlling the Mosul vilayet must be viewed through the strategic 
interest in controlling its oil. This is further highlighted by the monopolisation of oil in the late 
1920s. The redline agreement of 1928 handed:  
‘four conglomerates representing largely British, American, Dutch, and French interests… the 
majority of the companies involved… had other oil interests and, given surplus supply in the 
peaceful 1920s, wished to boost world prices by delaying drilling in Iraq. The [Iraq Petroleum 
Company] had exclusive control of Iraqi oil, but its major shareholders… had little incentive to 
find it and pump it.’206  
Thus, economic interests heavily influenced British insistence on Mosul’s inclusion with Iraq. 
Each case was part of the process of erecting a new imperial structure in the Middle East. This 
new structure was to be based upon the organising principle of ethnic nationalism, as 
                                                             
206 Susan Pedersen, The Guardians, p. 272. 
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promoted by the Allied powers, including Britain. Whereas the Ottoman regime had 
emphasised religious identity and pluralism. By 1926, the goals of the Greeks, Armenians, and 
Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan had not been achieved, and all had withered away 
in British Middle Eastern policy. 
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Appendices 
 
• Appendix 1.1: The “Big Four”, Composition of the British Government, relevant 
Ministries and Ministers 
The “Big Four” Allied leaders at the Paris Peace Conference 1919: David Lloyd George (British 
Prime Minister), Georges Clémenceau (French Prime Minister), Woodrow Wilson (US 
President), and Vittorio Emanuele Orlando (Italian Prime Minister). 
British Government 
Prime Minister: David Lloyd George, 6th December 1916 – 19th October 1922 (Coalition 
Government) 
Arthur Bonar Law, 23rd October 1922 – 20th May 1923 (Conservative Government) 
Stanley Baldwin, 23rd May 1923 – 16th January 1924 (Conservative Government) 
Ramsay MacDonald, 22nd January 1924 – 4th November 1924 (Labour Government) 
Stanley Baldwin, 4th November 1924 – 5th June 1929 (Conservative Government) 
Foreign Secretary: Arthur Balfour, 10th December 1916 – 23rd October 1919 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs: Lord George Curzon (1st Marquess Curzon of 
Kedleston), 23rd October 1919 – 22nd January 1924 
Ramsay MacDonald, 22nd January 1924 – 3rd November 1924 (whilst Prime Minister) 
Austen Chamberlain, 3rd November 1924 – 4th June 1929 
Secretary of State for War: Viscount Alfred Milner, 18th April 1918 – 10th January 1919 
Winston Churchill, 10th January 1919 – 13th February 1921 
Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, 13th February 1921 – 19th October 1922 
Edward Stanley (17th Earl of Derby), 24th October 1922 – 22nd January 1924 
Secretary of State for the Colonies: Viscount Walter Long, 10th December 1916 – 10th January 
1919 
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Viscount Alfred Milner, 10th January 1919 – 13th February 1921 
Winston Churchill, 13th February 1921 – 19th October 1922 
Victor Cavendish (9th Duke of Devonshire), 24th October 1922 – 22nd January 1924 
James Henry Thomas, 22nd January 1924 – 3rd November 1924 
Leo Amery, 6th November 1924 – 4th June 1929 
First Lord of the Admiralty: Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the Admiralty 17th July 1917 – 10th 
January 1919 
Viscount Walter Long, 10th January 1921 – 13th February 1921 
Arthur Hamilton Lee (1st Viscount of Fareham), 13th February 1921 – 31st  October 1922 
Leo Amery, 31st October – 28th January 1924 
 
• Appendix 1.2: key British Middle Eastern “experts” and officials 
Sir Mark Sykes – Lieutenant-Colonel military officer, served in the Intelligence department of 
the War Office under Sir Maurice de Bunsen’s Committee on Middle Eastern affairs, the 
Foreign Office’s Arab Bureau, designed the Hashemite flag for Arabia, and, with François 
Georges-Picot, authored the 1916 Franco-British agreement on Ottoman partition commonly 
referred to as the “Sykes-Picot agreement”; 
Maurice de Bunsen – head of the 1915 British Committee to consider British policy on the 
Ottoman empire; 
T. E. Lawrence (Lawrence “of Arabia”) – British confident of Emir Faisal during the Hashemite 
revolt against the Ottomans, served as an adviser to the Arab delegation to the Paris Peace 
Conference; 
Edmund Allenby – led British and Imperial troops to capture Beersheba, Jaffa, and Jerusalem, 
October to December 1917; High Commissioner for Sudan and Egypt, 1919-1925; 
Gertrude Bell – notable political resident in Arabia, appointed “Oriental Secretary”; 
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Percy Cox – High Commissioner of Iraq following the 1920 Iraqi revolt; 
Arnold Wilson – British civil commissioner in Baghdad in 1918-20 (acting High Commissioner 
upon Cox’s absence); 
Foreign Office Political Intelligence Department officials: Louis Mallet; Arnold Toynbee; 
Harold Nicolson;  
Major Edward Noel – political officer in Sulaymaniya and exponent of an enlarged Kurdistan; 
Horace Rumbold, 9th Baronet – British High Commissioner to Constantinople 1920; British 
signatory of the Lausanne Treaty, 1923 (Lord Curzon the chief negotiator). 
 
• Appendix 2: Turkish leadership  
The three Pashas (preeminent Young Turk wartime leaders): 1) Minister of the interior, later 
Grand Vizier Mehmed Talât Bey (Pasha); Minister of War, Ismail Enver Pasha; and Minister of 
the Navy Ahmed Djemal Pasha; 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha (later surnamed Atatürk): nationalist leader throughout the “Turkish 
war of independence” – head of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Ankara Government) 
and later President of the Republic of Turkey, 1923-1938; 
İsmet Pasha (later İnönü): Turkish chief negotiator at Lausanne, 1923, successor President to 
Atatürk, 1938-1950; 
Ottoman signatories of the Treaty of Sévres: Grand Vizier Damat Ferid Pasha; Ottoman 
Ambassador for Switzerland Reşat Halis; Ottoman Minister of Education Hâdi Pasha; 
President of the Ottoman Senate (Ottoman upper house/ “Assembly of Notables”) Rıza Tevfik; 
Mehmed VI: the final Sultan of the Ottoman empire, 1923; 
Ahmet Tevfik Pasha: the final Grand Vizier of the Ottoman empire, 21st October 1920 – 4th 
November 1922; 
 
• Appendix 3: Greek leadership:  
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Prime Ministers:  
Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister, 6 October 1910 – 25th February 1915; 10th August 1915 
– 24th September 1915; and 14th June 1917 – 4th November 1920; 
Dimitrios Rallis, Prime Minister, 18th November 1920 – 6th February 1921; 
Nikalaos Kalogeropoulos, Prime Minister, 24th January 1921 – 25th March 1921; 
Dimitrios Gounaris, Prime Minister, 26th March 1921 – 3rd May 1922 (tried and executed);  
Nikolaos Stratos, Prime Minister, 3rd May 1922 – 9th May 1922 (tried and executed); 
Petros Protopapadakis, Prime Minister, 9th May 1922 – 28th August 1922 (tried and executed); 
Nikolaos Triantafyllakos, Prime Minister, 28th August 1922 – 16th September 1922; 
11th September 1922 – Greek revolution (military coup d’état led by Venizelist officers such 
as Nikolaos Plastiras, Stylianos Gonatas and Georgios Papandreou, following Greek defeat in 
Asia Minor, resulting in the “trial of the six” Greek officials blamed for the military defeat). 
Monarchs (House of Glücksburg): 
King Constantine I, King of Greece, 18th March 1913 – 11th June 1917; and 19th December 1920 
– 27th September 1922 (anti-war); 
King Alexander I, King of Greece, 11th June 1917 – 25th October 1920 (died). 
 
• Appendix 4: Armenian leaders: 
Armenian delegation to the Paris Peace Conference: Boghos Nubar Pasha, representative of 
the Ottoman Armenians;  
Avetis Aharonian, representative of the Armenian Republic; 
Andranik (Andranik Ozanian), Armenian military commander. 
 
• Appendix 5: Kurdish leaders:  
General Muhammad Sharif Pasha, southern Kurd, outspoken against Armenian genocide, 
exiled to Paris and head of the Kurdish delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, 1919. 
Sheikh Mahmud Bazanji – candidate for Kurdish leadership (a southern Kurd leading Sheikh 
of the Qadiri, proclaimed King of Kurdistan in various rebellions); 
Sheikh Taha of Nihri (Sayyid of Nihri); 
Sheikh Said – leader of February 1925 Kurdish rebellion in Anatolia – first large-scale Kurdish 
rebellion. 
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• Appendix 6: Select articles of the Treaty of Sévres, 1920 (emphasis added), in: 
Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 vol. II, Carnegie Endowment 
for international peace (New York, 1924).   
SECTION II. STRAITS. ARTICLE 37. 
‘The navigation of the Straits, including the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the 
Bosphorus, shall in future be open, both in peace and war, to every vessel of commerce or of 
war and to military and commercial aircraft, without distinction of flag. These waters shall not 
be subject to blockade, nor shall any belligerent right be exercised nor any act of hostility be 
committed within them, unless in pursuance of a decision of the Council of the League of 
Nations.’ p. 799 
ARTICLE 38. – will be a “Commission of the Straits” which controls the waters in ARTICLE 39 
(Mediterranean mouth of the Dardanelles, to the Black Sea mouth of the Bosphorus ‘and to 
the waters within three miles of each of these mouths’. ‘The Greek Government, so far as it 
is concerned, delegates to the Commission the same powers and undertakes to give it in all 
respects the same facilities. Such control shall be exercised in the name of the Turkish and 
Greek Governments respectively, and in the manner provided in this Section.’ p. 800 – 
(according to new boundaries, these were the Greco-Turkish Straits, not just Turkish Straits) 
ARTICLE 40. – ‘The Commission shall be composed of representatives appointed respectively 
by the United States of America (if and when that Government is willing to participate), the 
British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Russia (if and when Russia becomes a member of the 
League of Nations), Greece, Rumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey (if and when the two latter 
States become members of the League of Nations). Each Power shall appoint one 
representative. The representatives of the United States of America, the British Empire, 
France, Italy, Japan and Russia shall each have two votes. The representatives of Greece, 
Roumania, and Bulgaria and Turkey shall each have one vote. Each Commissioner shall be 
removable only by the Government which appointed him.’ p. 800 
ARTICLE 42. – the Commission will ‘have its own flag, its own budget and its separate 
organisation.’ p. 801 
ARTICLE 43. – Commission duties: a) ‘the execution of any works considered necessary for the 
improvement of the channels or the approaches to harbours;’ b) ‘the lighting and buoying of 
the channels;’ c) ‘the control of pilotage and towage;’ d) ‘the control of anchorages;’ e) ‘the 
control necessary to assure the application in the ports of Constantinople and Haidar Pasha 
of the regime prescribed in Articles 335 to 344, Part XI (Ports, Waterways and Railways) of the 
present Treaty;’ f) ‘the control of all matters relating to wrecks and salvage;’, g) ‘the control 
of lighterage;’. p. 801 
A study of British policy towards the Greeks, Armenians and Kurds in Anatolia and Southern Kurdistan 
 
Andrew Blore 
S2100797 
A(vi) 
SECTION III. KURDISTAN. ARTICLE 62. ‘A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed 
of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian Governments respectively shall 
draft within six months from the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local 
autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south of the 
southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier 
of Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia, as defined in Article 27, II (2) and (3). If unanimity 
cannot be secured on any question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission to 
their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain full safeguards for the protection of 
the Assyro-Chaldeans and other racial or religious minorities within these areas, and with this 
object a Commission composed of British, French, Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives 
shall visit the spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any, should be made in the 
Turkish frontier where, under the provisions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with 
that of Persia.’ p. 807 
ARTICLE 63. – Turkish Government ‘accept and execute’ 62 ‘within three months from their 
communication to the said Government.’ p. 807 
ARTICLE 64. ‘If within one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty the Kurdish 
peoples within the areas defined in Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the 
League of Nations in such a manner as to show that a majority of the population of these 
areas desires independence from Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples 
are capable of such independence and recommends that it should be granted to them, Turkey 
hereby agrees to execute such a recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over 
these areas. The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the subject of a separate 
agreement between the Principal Allied Powers and Turkey. If and when such renunciation 
takes place, no objection will be raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary 
adhesion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds inhabiting that part of Kurdistan 
which has hitherto been included in the Mosul vilayet.’ pp. 807-808 
SECTION IV. SMYRNA [Izmir]. ARTICLE 66. (defines city’s territory). ARTICLE 67. A Commission 
shall be constituted within fifteen days from the coming into force of the present Treaty to 
trace on the spot the boundaries of the territories described in Article 66. This Commission 
shall be composed of three members nominated by the British, French and Italian 
Governments respectively, one member nominated by the Greek Government, and one 
nominated by the Turkish Government.’ pp. 809-810 
ARTICLE 68. ‘the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 will be assimilated, in 
application of the present Treaty, to territory detached from Turkey.’ p. 810 
ARTICLE 69. ‘The city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66 remain under Turkish 
sovereignty. Turkey, however, transfers to the Greek Government the exercise of her rights 
of sovereignty over the city of Smyrna and the said territory. In witness of such sovereignty 
the Turkish flag shall remain permanently hoisted over an outer fort in the town of Smyrna. 
The fort will be designated by the Principal Allied Powers.’ p. 810 
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ARTICLE 70. ‘The Greek Government will be responsible for the administration of the city of 
Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66, and will effect this administration by means of 
a body of officials which it will appoint specially for the purpose.’ p. 810 
ARTICLE 71. ‘The Greek Government shall be entitled to maintain in the city of Smyrna and 
the territory defined in Article 66 the military forces required for the maintenance of order 
and public security.’ p. 810 
ARTICLE 72. ‘A local parliament shall be set up with an electoral system calculated to ensure 
proportional representation of all sections of the population, including racial, linguistic and 
religious minorities. Within six months of the coming into force of the present Treaty the 
Greek Government shall submit to the Council of the League of Nations a scheme for an 
electoral system complying with the above requirements; this scheme shall not come into 
force until approved by a majority of the Council. The Greek Government shall be entitled to 
postpone the elections for so long as may be required for the return of the inhabitants who 
have been banished or deported by the Turkish authorities, but such postponement shall not 
exceed a period of one year from the coming into force of the present Treaty.’ pp. 810-811 
ARTICLE 83. ‘When a period of five years shall have elapsed after the coming into force of the 
present Treaty the local parliament referred to in Article 72 may, by a majority of votes, ask 
the Council of the League of Nations for the definite incorporation in the Kingdom of Greece 
of the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 66. The Council may require, as a 
preliminary, a plebiscite under conditions which it will lay down. In the event of such 
incorporation as a result of the application of the foregoing paragraph, the Turkish 
sovereignty referred to in Article 69 shall cease. Turkey hereby renounces in that event in 
favour of Greece all rights and title over the city of Smyrna and the territory defined in Article 
66.’ p. 813 
SECTION VI. ARMENIA. ARTICLE 88. ‘Turkey, in accordance with the action already taken by 
the Allied Powers, hereby recognises Armenia as a free and independent State.’ p. 814. 
ARTICLE 89. ‘Turkey and Armenia as well as the other High Contracting Parties agree to submit 
to the arbitration of the President of the United States of America the question of the frontier 
to be fixed between Turkey and Armenia in the vilayets of Erzerum, Trebizond, Van and Bitlis, 
and to accept his decision thereupon, as well as any stipulations he may prescribe as to access 
for Armenia to the sea, and as to the demilitarisation of any portion of Turkish territory 
adjacent to the said frontier.’ p. 815 
SECTION VII. SYRIA, MESOPOTAMIA, PALESTINE. ARTICLE 94. ‘The High Contracting Parties 
agree that Syria and Mesopotamia shall, in accordance with the fourth paragraph of Article 
22, Part I (Covenant of the League of Nations), be provisionally recognised as independent 
States subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until 
such time as they are able to stand alone. A Commission shall be constituted within fifteen 
days from the coming into force of the present Treaty to trace on the spot the frontier line 
described in Article 27, II (2) and (3). This Commission will be composed of three members 
nominated by France, Great Britain and Italy respectively, and one member nominated by 
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Turkey; it will be assisted by a representative of Mesopotamia for the Mesopotamian frontier. 
The determination of the other frontiers of the said States, and the selection of the 
Mandatories, will be made by the Principal Allied Powers.’ p. 816 
 
• Appendix 7: Select articles in The Treaty of Lausanne, 1923 (emphasis added), in: 
Lawrence Martin, Ed., The Treaties of Peace 1919-1923 vol. II, Carnegie Endowment 
for international peace (New York, 1924). 
‘British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene state, of 
the one part, and Turkey, of the other part’. p. 959 
Article 3(2): Border with Iraq ‘shall be laid down in friendly arrangement to be concluded 
between Turkey and Great Britain within nine months’ p. 962 
‘In the event of no agreement being reached between the two Governments within the time 
mentioned, the dispute shall be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.’ p. 962  
SECTION III. PROTECTION OF MINORITIES. 
Article 38: ‘The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life 
and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, language, race 
or religion. All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise, whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be incompatible 
with public order and good morals. Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of 
movement and of emigration, subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of 
the territory, to all Turkish nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for 
national defence, or for the maintenance of public order.’ p. 971 
